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No government agency has jurisdiction over the truth.
FBI Agent Fox Mulder, "The X-Files" (1994)
As federal regulators impose increasing limits on what manufacturers
may say about their products, constitutional protections for commercial
speech become ever more important. Indeed, the United States Supreme
Court's most recent First Amendment decisions suggest meaningful
regard for the value of advertising and labeling as types of protected
expression. At the same time, however, federal lawmakers are imposing
ever more onerous restrictions on promotional activities and product
labeling.
On April 19, 1995, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing CO.,I the Supreme
Court unanimously decided that a federal regulation prohibiting the
disclosure of alcohol content in the labeling of malt beverages violated
the First Amendment's protections for commercial speech. The Court's
decision provides a useful vehicle for a discussion of consumer product
labeling and advertising issues as they arise in a variety of different
contexts. Fundamentally, the opinion suggests that the government may
not deprive consumers of truthful information for their own protection.
Part I describes a number of federal regulatory limitations on the
disclosure of truthful information to consumers. For example, the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) recently promulgated regulations which
severely restrict the use of health claims and similar statements in food
labeling. In addition, federal regulations currently prohibit the inclusion
of certain truthful information to accompany government-mandated
warning labels for a number of different product categories, and the
FDA is drafting guidelines to limit the dissemination of accurate
therapeutic information about prescription drugs and medical devices to
physicians.
Part II provides a brief history of the Supreme Court's commercial
free speech jurisprudence. Since initially extending the protections of the
First Amendment to such speech twenty years ago, the Court has
struggled to define the precise scope of these protections. The Court's
unanimous decision in Coors represents an important extension and
clarification of its prior holdings in this area.
Finally, Part III discusses the implications of the Coors decision for
controversies surrounding federal efforts to control the dissemination of
accurate information in pursuit of goals other than the protection of
consumers from false or misleading promotional claims. Given its
notable lack of deference to the judgments of federal policymakers, the
1. 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995).
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Court's recent decision may have an important impact on broadly
applicable regulations such as the FDA's food labeling restrictions.
I. FEDERAL REsTRICTIONS ON PRODUCT LABELING

This Part introduces several federal limitations on the disclosure of
truthful information related to consumer goods. The Coors litigation
involved a challenge to longstanding prohibitions on the disclosure of
alcohol content in the labeling and advertising of malt beverages. More
recent examples involve primarily the FDA, an agency which regulates
the labeling of a wide variety of conSumer products.2 FDA initiatives
governing health claims in food labeling, warning statements across
several product categories, and the exchange of scientific information
about drugs and medical devices are described in turn. Each of these
illustrations will be evaluated in Part ill against the backdrop of the
Supreme Court's commercial fre~ speech decisions.
A. Prohibitions on the Disclosure of Alcohol Content
In 1935, shortly after the repeal of Prohibition by the Twenty-First
Amendment,3 Congress enacted the Federal Alcohol Administration Act
(FAAA).4 Among other things, the Act prohibited the disclosure of
alcohol content in the labeling and advertising of malt beverages.5 At
the time of enactment, Congress noted the difficulty of obtaining
accurate measurements of alcohol content due to varying brewing
conditions, so it sought to protect consumers from deception as well as
ensure fair competition within the malt beverage industry.6 Becaus~
modem technology now enables brewers to measure the alcohol content

2. In a particularly controversial initiative, the FDA recently asserted authority over
tobacco products and proposed significant restrictions on advertising purportedly aimed at
teenage smokers. See 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (1995). The tobacco industry has already challenged
these restrictions on First Amendment and other grounds. See Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah,
Surrealism in the Proposed Regulation of Tobacco Products, 48 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming
1996); Claudia MacLachlan, FDA Draws First in Tobacco Wars, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 28, 1995, at
AI, A21.
3. U.S. CaNST. amend. XXI, § I; see also Sidney J. Spaeth, Comment, The Twenty-First
Amendment and State Control Over Intoxicating Liquor: Accommodating the Federal Interest,
79 CAL. L. REV. 161 (1991).
•
4. Federal Alcohol Administration Act, ch. 814,49 Stat. 977 (1935) (codified as amended
at 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-219a (1994».
5. 27 U.S.C. § 205(e)(2), (1)(2) (1994).
6. See Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady, 944 F.2d 1543, 1547-48 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting
House Committee report and describing testimony about the difficulty in obtaining accurate
alcohol content measurements in beer); see also National Distrib. Co. v. United States Treasury
Dep't, 626 F.2d 997, 1004-12 (D.C. Cir..1980) (detailing the FAAA's legislative history).
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of their beverages very precisely,7 however, the original concern that
consumers might be misled by inaccurate alcohol content labeling or
advertising has largely disappeared.
The Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms (BATF) enforces the FAAA. In regulations implementing the
statute, BATF prohibited the disclosure of alcohol content in the
labeling and advertising of malt beverages, 8 a class of products which
includes beer. 9 In addition, descriptive terms that suggest high alcohol
content may not be used,1O but the regulations allow the use of
terminology suggesting low alcohol content in certain circumstances. II
By contrast, consistent with the requirements of the FAAA, the
disclosure of alcohol content is permitted in the labeling of many wine
products,12 and it is required in the labeling of distilled liquors as well
as wines containing more than fourteen percent alcohol. 13
When Coors first challenged the prohibition against alcohol content
labeling and advertising, the government emphasized its interest in
preventing so-called "strength wars.,,14 The government argued that, if
alcohol content disclosure were permitted, competing brewers would
continually increase the alcohol content of their products in an effort to
capture a larger share of the market. Although the asserted interest in
preventing strength wars seems valid and substantial,15 the central issue

7. See, e.g., T.M. Dowhanick & I. Russell, Advances in Detection and Identification
Methods Applicable to the Brewing Industry, in BEER AND WINE PRODUCfION: ANALYSIS,
CHARACfERIZATION, AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES 13 (Barry H. Gump ed., 1993). Indeed,
existing federal regulations assume that, within narrow tolerances, brewers can accurately
measure alcohol content. See, e.g., 27 C.F.R. §§ 5.37(b), 7.26(b) (1993).
8. See 27 C.F.R. § 7.26(a) (1993) {"The alcohol's content and the percentage and
quantity of the original extract shall not be stated unless required by State law."); id. § 7.54(c).
BATF suspended § 7.26 in order to comply with the district court's order in Coors enjoining
the enforcement of this regulation, and it promulgated an interim regulation permitting the
disclosure of alcohol content on beer labels. See 58 Fed. Reg. 21,228, 21,232 (1993) (codified
at 27 C.F.R. § 7.71 (1994».
9. See 27 U.S.C. § 211(a)(7) (1994); 27 C.F.R. §§ 7.10, 7.24(d) (1993).
10. See 27 C.F.R. § 7.29(1) (1993) (prohibiting the use of words such as "strong," "extra
strength," and "high test"); see also id. § 7.29(g) (prohibiting the use of numerals or other
designs "which are likely to be considered as statements of alcoholic content").
11. See id. § 7.26(b).
12. See id. § 4.36(a) (requiring either content disclosure or type designation if the wine's
alcohol content is 14% or less).
13. Id. §§ 4.36(a), 5.37(a). Distilled liquor labels 'llay also include references to degrees
of proof. /d. § 5.37(a)(2). Although separate statements of alcohol content generally may not
appear in the advertising of wine products, see id. § 4.64(a)(8), alcohol content disclosure is
mandatory in the advertising for distilled liquors, id. § 5.63(c).
14. See Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady, 944 F.2d 1543, 1548-49 (10th Cir. 1991).
15. The social and economic costs of increased alcohol consumption are undeniable. See,
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addressed in the Coors litigation was whether the government legitimate
ly can prevent beer manufacturers from including truthful,
nonmisleading information about alcohol content in pursuit of such a _
broader social goal. 16
B. Limitations on Health Claims in Food Labeling
In 1990, Congress enacted the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act
(NLEA) ,17 a statute aimed at substantially reforming federal regulation
of food product labeling to enable consumers to make more informed
choices about their diets. IS Before that time, the FDA used a vague
prohibition against "false or misleading" statements to regulate health
messages in labeling.19 In addition to mandating the inclusion of
comprehensive nutrition information in labeling, the NLEA prohibited
-all unapproved health claims,2° and directed the FDA to approve health
claims only when they were supported by "significant scientific
agreement.,,21 The Act also delineated certain situations in which food
companies would be barred from making even FDA-approved health
claims.22

e.g., J. Michael McGinnis & William H. Foege, Actual Causes of Death in the United States,
270 JAMA 2207, 2208 (1993) ("Misuse of alcohol accounts for approximately 100,000 deaths
each year, but the related health, social, and economic consequences of alcohol extend far
beyond the mortality tables."); Use ofAlcohol Linked to Rise in Fetal Illness, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
7, 1995, at A27.
16. See infra Part II.C.
17. Pub. L. No. 101-535, ID:l- Stat. 2353 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 21 
U.S.C.).
18. See H.R. REP. No. 538, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1990) ("Health claims supported
by a significant scientific agreement can reinforce the Surgeon General recommendations and
help Americans to maintain a balanced and healthful diet."); 136 CONGo REC. S16,610 (1990)
(statement of Sen. Hatch) ("Food companies should be able to advertise the health benefit of
their product so long as these claims are not false or misleading."). A recent study of consumer
use of the new nutrition label reveals, however, that Americans are not significantly altering
their consumption habits. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Food Labels Don't Change Eating Habits,
N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1995, at B1.
19. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(a)(1) (1994). Under the FDA's 1973 nutrition labeling
regulations, a food was deemed to be misbranded if its labeling claimed or implied "[t]hat the
food, because of the presence or absence of certain dietary properties, is adequate or effective
in the prevention, cure, mitigation, or treatment of any disease or symptom." 38 Fed. Reg. 2128
(1973) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(k)(1) (1993». Although historically it had
prohibited all health claims in the labeling of food products, the FDA temporarily liberalized its
policy in the 1980s. See 55 Fed. Reg. 5176,5184 (1990); 52 Fed. Reg. 28,843 (1987); United
States v. Undetermined Quantities of ... "Exachol," 716 F. Supp. 787, 789-90"(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(I)(B) (1994).
21. [d. § 343(r)(3)(B)(i).
22. See id. § 343(r)(3)(A)(ii).
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In 1993, the FDA published its final regulations implementing the
NLEA.23 Some of the most important aspects of these new food
labeling rules include mandatory nutrition labeling/4 guidelines for the
use of nutrient content claims (such as "low fat"),25 and restrictions on
health messages in product labeling.26 For instance, under the regula
tions as originally promulgated, a company could not have made the
following truthful claim in the labeling of a food product containing
folic acid:
The U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) have encour
aged all women of childbearing age to consume 0.4
milligrams of folic acid each day to reduce their risk of
having a pregnancy which results in a neural tube birth
defect such as spina bifida?7

23. 58 Fed. Reg. 2066-2926 (1993) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
C.F.R. pt. 101); see also 59 Fed. Reg. 350-426 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 21 C.F.R. pt. 101) (dietary supplement labeling); 58 Fed. Reg. 632-85 (1993) (codified in
scattered sections of 9 C.F.R. pts. 317, 381) (Department of Agriculture rules governing the
labeling of meat and poultry food products). The FDA's initial "Regulatory Impact Analysis"
includes the following observation: "If mostly incorrect claims are prohibited, consumers will
benefit from only seeing those claims that are correct. On the other hand, if claims that are
likely to be true are removed, this will decrease the total benefits of the 1990 amendments as
consumers will lose valuable information." 56 Fed. Reg. 60,856, 60,869 (1991).
24. See 21 C.F.R. § 101.9 (1994).
25. See id. § 101.13. In addition to standardizing descriptors such as "high," "low" and
"free" for different nutrients, these regulations flatly prohibit any references to nutrients or
constituents such as "unsaturated fat," "omega-3 fatty acids" and "complex carbohydrates." See
58 Fed. Reg. 2079, 2090-91, 2100-01 (1993); see also 21 C.F.R. § 101.13(b) (1994) (prohibiting
any express or implied content claims for nutrients which may not appear on the nutrition
panel); 58 Fed. Reg. 2302, 2345 (1993) (explaining same).
26. See 21 C.F.R. § 101.14 (1994). Responding to the underutilization of health claims
by food manufacturers, the FDA recently proposed several important revisions to these
regulations. See 60 Fed. Reg. 66,206, 66,208 (1995).
27. See Centers for Disease Control, Recommendations for the Use of Folic Acid to
Reduce the Number of Cases of Spina Bifida and Other Neural Tube Defects, 41 MORB. &
MORT. WKLY. REP. No. RR-14, 1 (1992). Notwithstanding this unqualified recommendation
issued by one of its sister agencies in the Department of Health and Human Services, the FDA
initially refused to authorize any health claim for folic acid. See 58 Fed. Reg. 2606, 2620 (1993).
In response to heavy criticism, the FDA finally approved the claim a full year later, though only
for dietary supplements and not conventional food products. See 59 Fed. Reg. 433, 434 (1994)
(codified at 21 C.F.R. § 101.79 (1994)). Although recent studies suggest other important health
protective effects of this micronutrient, see A Little Folic Acid May Prove to Be Lifesaver,
GAINESVILLE SUN, July 25, 1995, at I A, no truthful claims may be made in food labeling unless
and until the FDA approves a petition requesting authorization of an appropriate health claim.
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So far, the FDA has approved eight general claims relating nutrients to
disease or other health-related conditions, and it has rejected five
others.28
The regulations set out in great detail how the levels of different
nutrients may be characterized in product labeling. With regard to health
claims, only those statements expressly approved by the Agency may be
used. For instance, only if a product qualifies as "low fat," and only if
it does not contain any disqualifying levels of certain components such
as cholesterol or sodium,29 may its labeling include a bland statement
that a low fat diet "may" reduce the risk of "some cancers.,,30 More
over, such health claims could not appear on the labels of otherwise
nutritionally worthless foods. For example, although it is undeniably true
that jelly beans are "fat free," and therefore do not contribute a nutrient
associated with some cancers, such a label statement would not be
permitted under the FDA regulations.31
These strict labeling rules will also constrain food industry advertis
ing. With the exception of prescription drugs and restricted medical
devices, the FDA generally does not regulate product advertising.32
Instead, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) exercises such authori
ty.33 The FDA's control over "labeling" is quite broad, however,

28. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.71-.79 (1994). Examples of approved food-disease claims
include calcium and osteoporosis, id. § 101.72; dietary lipids and cancer, id. § 101.73; sodium
and hypertension, id. § 101.74; dietary saturated fat and cholesterol and risk of coronary heart
disease, id. § 101.75; fiber-containing grain products, fruits, and vegetables and cancer, id. §
101.76; fruits, vegetables, and grain products that contain fiber, particularly soluble fiber, and
risk of coronary heart disease, id. § 101.77; and fruits and vegetables and cancer, id. § 101.78.
The Agency recently proposed approval of a health claim linking oat products and heart disease.
See 61 Fed. Reg. 296 (1996). For a discussion of the scientific standard for approval of health
claims under the NLEA, see Mara A. Michaels, Comment, FDA Regulation of Health Claims
Under the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990: A Proposal for a Less Restrictive
Scientific Standard, 44 EMORY L.J. 319 (1995).
29. 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(a)(5) (1994). Disqualifying nutrients foreclose health claims even
if the claims relate to a disease condition (e.g., cancer) which is unaffected by the disqualifying
nutrient (e.g., sodium). For example, the labeling of whole milk may not include the approved
health claim regarding calcium and osteoporosis because the milk's high levels of saturated fat
may increase the risk of heart disease. See 58 Fed. Reg. 2478, 2489 (1993).
30. 21 C.F.R. § 101.73(c) (1994). The regulation offers the following model health claim:
"Development of cancer depends on many factors. A diet low in total fat may reduce the risk
of some cancers." ld. § 101.73(e)(1). The model claim for calcium and osteoporosis is even
more cumbersome. See id. § 101.72(e).
31. See id. § 101.14(e)(6).
32. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(n), (q) (1994). The statute also calls for coordination between the
FDA and the Fedeml Tmde Commission (FTC) in the regulation of advertising for vitamin and
mineml products. See id. § 378.
33. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 52-57 (1994).
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reaching any written, printed, or graphic material that accompanies a
product,34 and the intended use of a product may be divined from
advertising as well as labeling.35 Thus, a great deal of promotional
material is potentially subject to FDA controls. Moreover, the FTC often
relies on FDA labeling restrictions when it determines whether
advertising claims are false or deceptive. 36 Although it remains unclear
whether the Commission will abide by the FDA's nutrient content claim
and health message restrictions, it seems probable that the FTC will at
least informally rely on these rules when deciding in particular cases
whether advertising claims about a food product may be misleading. 37
In any event, the FDA's broad rulemaking efforts differ fundamentally
from the FTC's case-by-case adjudicative approach,38 a difference that
may have some constitutional significance. 39
C. Restrictions on Product Warning Statements

The federal government imposes a wide variety of risk labeling
requirements on the manufacturers of consumer products. 40 In addition
to prescribing the precise language that must be used in labeling,
agencies also restrict the use of warning statements in a number of
34. See 21 u.s.c. § 321(k), (m) (1994); Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 348-50
(1948).
35. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (1994); Hanson v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 30, 35 (D.
Minn.) (noting that it is "well established that the 'intended use' of a product, within the
meaning of the [FD&C] Act, is determined from its label, accompanying labeling, promotional
claims, advertising, and any other relevant source"), affd, 540 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1976).
36. See, e.g., Removatron Int'! Corp. v. FTC, 884 F.2d 1489, 1494-95 (1st Cir. 1989);
Thompson Medical Co. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC,
738 F.2d 554, 558-60 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985); American Home
Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 691 n.17 (3d Cir. 1982).
37. See F-D-C REPORTS ("The Tan Sheet"), May 16, 1994, at 27 (describing the FTC's
new "enforcement policy statement" which allows properly qualified health claims in advertising
for food products even if these claims are not approved by the FDA for use in labeling); see also
Elisabeth A. Sachs, Health Claims in the Marketplace: The Future of the FDA and the FTC's
Regulatory Split, 48 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 263 (1993); James M. Serafino, Developing Standards
for Health Claims-The FDA and the FTC, 47 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 335 (1992).
38. See Richard S. Higgins & Fred S. McChesney, Truth and Consequences: The Federal
Trade Commission's Ad Substantiation Policy, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND REGULATION: A VIEW
FROM INSIDE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 181, 182-84 (Robert J. Mackay et al. eds.,
1987); Arthur Best, Controlling False Advertising: A Comparative Study of Public Regulation,
In,[ustry Self-Policing, and Private Litigation, 20 GA. L. REV. I, 16-20 (1985); Peter Barton
Hutt, Government Regulation of Health Claims in Food Labeling and Advertising, 41 FOOD
DRUG COSMo L.J. 3,9-20 (1986).
39. See infra Part III.A.5.
40. See Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the "Right to Know" from the
"Need to Know" About Conswner Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 301-38 (1994).
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circumstances. With regard to risk information generally, FDA
regulations prohibit any "statement of differences of opinion with
respect to warnings . . . required in labeling for food, drugs, devices, or
cosmetics under the act."41 Thus, unless the FDA itself has prescribed
cautionary statements that reflect the degree of uncertainty underlying
a risk estimate, product manufacturers are prohibited from conveying
such information because it may undermine the warnings mandated by
the Agency.42
In the labeling of nonprescription drug products (also referred to as
over-the-counter (OTC) drugs), for instance, the FDA requires detailed
warning statements with regard to all acute risks associated with these
products. The Agency has promUlgated regulations in the form of
"monographs" which set out acceptable ingredient levels and combina
tions, along with the required labeling, for different product catego
ries.43 Manufacturers of OTC drug products may use only the precise
warning language set out in the monographs or other applicable
regulations.44 Although manufacturers may choose to include other
accurate cautionary information not prescribed by the FDA, this
information must appear in some portion of the label other than the
"Warnings" section.45
41. 21 C.F.R. § 1.21(c)(1) (1994). Other agencies also prohibit the use of disclaimers to
accompany warnings on the labels of consumer products. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 1500.122 (1994)
(CPSC labeling requirements for hazardous substances); 40 C.F.R. § 156.1O(a)(5)(viii) (1994)
(EPA pesticide label warnings).
42. See 39 Fed. Reg. 33,229, 33,232 (1974) (''[T]here is no basis to permit warnings to
be discounted by an opinion that the warning is really not necessary at all. ... [A] warning must
be unencumbered and unambiguous."). The FDA concluded that "where warnings are required,
disclamatory opinions necessarily detract from the warning in such a manner as to be confusing
and miSleading." [d.; see also 40 Fed. Reg. 28,582, 28,583 (1975) ("[W]arnings about possible
hazards associated with the use of a drug must, to be effective, remain undiluted by expressions
of opinion discounting the risk.").
43. See 21 C.F.R. § 330.10(a) (1994). Examples of monograph product categories include
night-time sleep aids, id. § 338.50(c); antacids, id. § 331.30(c); antihistamines, id. § 341.72(c);
and anorectal drug products, id. § 346.50(c).
44. 21 C.F.R. § 330.1(c)(2)(iv) (1994); 51 Fed. Reg. 16,258, 16,263 (1986) ("The agency
believes that concisely and consistently worded warnings are essential to the safe use of an OTC
drug product and that permitting flexibility in this section of labeling could put consumers at
risk."); 38 Fed. Reg. 31,260, 31,264 (1973); see also Stephen H. McNamara, FDA Regulation
of Labeling and the Developing Law of Commercial Free Speech, 37 FOOD DRUG COSMo LJ.
394, 400 (1982) (criticizing this policy). The FDA recently gave manufacturers some limited
choice in formulating OTC warning statements, permitting the interchange of words such as
"conSUlt" and "ask," and "physician" and "doctor." 59 Fed. Reg. 3998,4000 (1994) (codified
at 21 C.F.R. § 330.1(i) (1994».
45. See 56 Fed. Reg. 63,554, 63,566 (1991) (discussing warning that cautioned against
using OTC dandruff products on children under two years of age, a warning recommended by
an expert panel but rejected as unnecessary by the FDA); 50 Fed. Reg. 2124, 2128 (1985) (even
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D. Restraints on Continuing Medical Education Programs

In November 1992, the FDA published what it characterized as a
"Draft Policy Statement" to address industry-supported scientific and
educational activities concerning drugs and medical devices. 46 This
document cautions that continuing medical education (CME) programs
and scientific symposia funded by the pharmaceutical and medical
device industries will be subject to regulation as promotional labeling
or advertising for any products discussed during these programs except
in limited circumstances where sponsoring companies ensure that the
program will be independent and objective. 47 FDA officials have
repeatedly suggested that many industry-sponsored CME events are
merely elaborate advertising opportunities and that the scientific
information presented tends to be self-serving or even inaccurate. 48
By enumerating several steps for ensuring independence in program
content, the Draft Policy Statement purports to strike "a proper balance
between the need for industry-supported dissemination of current
scientific information and the need to ensure that industry advertising
activities meet the requirements of the law.,,49 Although characterized
as defining a safe harbor, the Draft Policy Statement represents a
significant extension of the FDA's traditional controls over the labeling
and advertising of prescription drugs and medical devices, potentially
limiting the robust exchange of scientific information about important
therapeutic advances. 5o A further analysis of these and other federal

truthful and non misleading information "may not appear in any portion of the labeling required
by the monograph and may not detract from such required information").
46. 57 Fed. Reg. 56,412 (1992). In the wake of strong industry reaction to the Draft Policy
Statement, the FDA extended the comment deadline. 58 Fed. Reg. 6126 (1993). To date, no final
rule or guideline has been issued. In response to a recent citizen petition requesting the
withdrawal of the Draft Policy Statement, however, the Agency invited additional comments.
See 59 Fed. Reg. 59,820 (1994).
47. See 57 Fed. Reg. at 56,412-13.
48. See, e.g., id. at 56,412; David A. Kessler & Wayne L. Pines, The Federal Regulation
ofPrescription Drug Advertising and Promotion, 264 JAMA 2409, 2412 (1990). For a response
to some of these arguments, see Lars Noah, Death ofa Salesman: To What Extent Can the FDA
Regulate the Promotional Statements of Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives?, 47 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 309, 322-32 (1992).
49. 57 Fed. Reg. at 56,412; see also David O. Adams, FDA Policy on Industry-Supported
Scientific and Educational Activities: Current Developments, 47 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 629 (1992);
cf 21 U.S.C. § 343-2 (1994) (excluding from the definition of "labeling" certain scientific
publications when distributed by manufacturers or retailers of dietary supplements).
50. See Lars Noah, Constraints on the Off-Label Uses of Prescription Drug Products, 16
J. PROD. & Toxles LIAB. 139, 142-46 & n.34 (1994). Congress is considering proposals which
would allow manufacturers to distribute peer-reviewed scientific literature concerning off-label
uses. See Elyse Tanouye, Drug Makers Seek Relaxed Restrictions on Marketing, WALL ST. J.•
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restrictions on the dissemination of truthful information must be
deferred, however, until after a discussion of the protections afforded
commercial speech under the First Amendment.
ll. COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Until recently, the United States Supreme Court had not directly
addressed the scope of First Amendment protections for product
labeling. Most of the earlier cases dealt with advertising of goods and
services. Even so, it seemed reasonable to conclude that information
appearing on the label of a product deserved at least as much protection
as promotional claims made in other media. This Part discusses the
evolution of the commercial speech doctrine and examines how the
decision in Coors helps explicate the relevant constitutional framework.
A. Rationales for Protecting Commercial Speech

Since the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court has recognized that
advertising enjoys some of the First Amendment's guarantees for
freedom of expression. In the fIrst commercial speech case in this line,
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council,51 the Court struck down a state prohibition against the
advertising of prescription drug prices. The question in that case was
"whether speech which does no more than propose a commercial
transaction is so removed from any exposition of ideas, and from truth,
science, morality, and arts ... that it lacks all protection.,,52 The Court
decided that even such purely commercial speech, bereft of all the other
qualities typically associated with protected speech, still deserved some
constitutional protection, noting that the public's interest in the free flow
of commercial information might be "as keen, if not keener by far" than
its interest in political debate.53
Aug. 31,1995, at Bl; see also 60 Fed. Reg. 62,471, 62,472 (1995) (inviting comments on draft
FDA guidance which would allow companies to disseminate reprints of peer-reviewed scientific
articles).
51. 425 U.S. 748 (1976); see also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) (noting
that the "relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or of services does not make it
valueless in the marketplace of ideas"). Prior to this time, the Court had suggested that the First
Amendment placed no limitations on government regulation of commercial advertising. See
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942); see also Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The
Anti-History and Pre-History o/Commercial Speech, 71 TEx. L. REV. 747, 754-74 (1993).
52. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 762 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
53. [d. at 763. The Court added that the information at issue could have a profound impact
on the consumer's quality of life: "When drug prices vary as strikingly as they do, information
as to who is charging what becomes more than a convenience. It could mean the alleviation of
physical pain or the enjoyment of basic necessities." [d. at 763-64.
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In its subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court repeatedly has
recognized the value of advertising as one mechanism for the dissemina
tion of information.54 After all, promotional advertising involves the
dissemination of information about a product which the seller "presum
ably knows more about than anyone else.,,55 One year after Virginia
State Board, in striking down a blanket prohibition on attorney price
advertising in newspapers, Justice Blackmun wrote that:
[S]ignificant societal interests are served by such speech.
Advertising, though entirely commercial, may often carry
information of import to significant issues of the day. And
commercial speech serves to inform the public of the
availability, nature, and prices of products and services, and
thus performs an indispensable role in the allocation of
resources in a free enterprise system. 56
In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,57 for example, the Court
held that a federal law prohibiting unsolicited mailings was unconstitu
tional when applied to a pharmaceutical company distributing informa
tional pamphlets which encouraged the use of contraceptives. The Court
recognized that such materials-containing information related to public
health matters-deserved a high degree of protection under the Constitution. 58

54. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
Commercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but
also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible
dissemination of information.... Even when advertising communicates only an
incomplete version of the relevant facts, the First Amendment presumes that some
accurate information is better than no information at all.... The First
Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the informational
function of advertising.
/d. at 561-63. For the claim that most advertising is devoid of informational content, see Ronald
K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce & Communication, 71 TEx. L. REV. 697, 710-27
(1993). But see Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for

Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEx. L. REV. 777, 794-800 (1993) (challenging
the accuracy of this descriptive thesis).
55. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 772 n.24; see also Burt Neuborne, The First
Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 5, 31-32
(1989).
56. Bates V. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (citations omitted).
57. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
58. See id. at 69 (,,[W]here ... a speaker desires to convey truthful information relevant
to important social issues such as family planning and the prevention of venereal disease, we
have previously found the First Amendment interest served by such speech paramount.").
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Since Virginia State Board, the Court has continu~d to develop and
refine its definition of commercial speech, though it has had difficulty
assessing restrictions on speech which contains both commercial and
noncommercial elements.59 Traditionally safeguarded speech enjoys full
protection notwithstanding the fact that it may pertain to a commercial
activity; the mere existence of some underlying profit motive does not
trigger a lesser degree of constitutional scrutiny.60
The type of commercial speech accorded somewhat lesser constitu
tional protection represents only a narrow category, namely "expression
related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audi
ence.,,61 In Virginia State Board, the Court recognized that the
"durability" and "hardiness" of commercial speech reduces the risk that
it might be chilled by regulation.62 These attributes of commercial
speech, together with the fact that disseminators of such expression are
better able to determine its truthfulness, may "make it appropriate to
require that a commercial message appear in such a form, or include
such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary
to prevent its being deceptive.,,63
Thus, because of its greater durability, commercial speech may be
regulated in order to prevent consumer deception. Ever since Virginia

59. See Alan Howard, The Constitutionality of Deceptive Speech Regulations: Replacing
the Commercial Speech Doctrine with a Tort-Based Relational Framework, 41 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1093 (1991); David F. McGowan, Comment, A Critical Analysis ofCommercial Speech,
78 CAL. L. REV. 359, 371-81 (1990).
60. Board of Trustees of the State Univ. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989) ("Some of our
most valued forms of fully protected speech are uttered for a profit.").
61. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561; see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447, 456 (1978) ("To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and
noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of
the Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather than subject the
First Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial speech a limited
measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First
Amendment values.").
62. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 772 n.24. But cf. McGowan, supra note 59, at 444-48
(arguing that full First Amendment protection for commercial speech would not undermine the
government's ability to control false advertising).
63. Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 772 n.24; see also Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 482
(1987) (noting that it would be" impermissibly "paternalistic" to strike down disclosure
requirements because "a zeal to protect the public from 'too much information' could not
withstand First Amendment scrutiny"); cf. Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First
Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 372, 385-86 (1979) (questioning the distinction between
commercial and political speech based on the relative ease of verification); Alex Kozinski &
Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REv. 627, 634-52 (1990)
(disputing grounds for distinguishing commercial speech); McGowan, supra note 59, at 405-10
(same).
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State Board, however, the Court has treated with suspicion government
efforts to achieve collateral goals through the suppression of truthful and
nonmisleading information. 64

The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our
social and cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and
information flourish. Some of the ideas and information are
vital, some of slight worth. But the general rule is that the
speaker and the audience, not the §overnment, assess the
value of the information presented.
Commercial speech is not protected under the First Amendment solely
or even primarily for the benefit of the speaker but rather serves the
interests of listeners. Although the government may protect consumers
from false or misleading product claims, it generally may not prohibit
truthful and nondeceptive claims in pursuit of some other end.
B. Elaboration of the Central Hudson Test
In 1980, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission,66 the Court addressed a state regulation of commercial
speech whose goal was to influence consumer behavior rather than
protect the public from potentially misleading information. It announced
a four-part test for evaluating commercial free speech claims:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech
to come within that provision, it at least must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether
the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether
the regulation directly advances the governmental interest

64. See, e.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9 ("We review with special care
regulations that entirely suppress commercial speech in order to pursue a nonspeech-related
policy."); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1977) (striking
down prohibition on the posting of "For Sale" signs in an effort to reduce the departure of white
homeowners from racially integrating neighborhoods); Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 769-70
("[T]he State's protectiveness of its citizens rests in large measure on the advantages of their
being kept in ignorance. . .. It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of
suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First
Amendment makes for us.").
65. Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1798 (1993).
66. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.67

In other words, assuming that the speech does not relate to some
unlawful activity and is not inherently misleading, the government may
restrict commercial speech only to achieve a substantial interest, and
then only to the extent necessary.
The issue in Central Hudson was whether utility company advertise
ments promoting the consumption of electricity could be prohibited by
the State of New York's Public Service Commission without running
afoul of the First Amendment. Applying the first prong of its newly
elaborated test, the Court found that the advertising related to a lawful
activity and was not misleading.68 Under the second prong, the
government's asserted interests in encouraging energy conservation and
promoting fair utility rates were deemed to be substantial.69 Under the
third prong of its test, however, the Court noted that the link between
the advertising prohibition and the utility's rate structure was tenuous,
even if there was an "immediate connection" between the advertising at
issue and demand for electricity.70 Finally, the Court determined that
the Commission's order failed the fourth prong of the test because it
was "more extensive than necessary" to accomplish the government's
goals.71 The Commission failed to show that a more limited approach

67. [d. at 566. It should be noted, however, that in a number of the Court's most recent
decisions, the four-part Central Hudson analysis has evolved somewhat: the initial prong became
a threshold inquiry and the other prongs now constitute a tripartite test. See, e.g., Edenfield, 113
S. Ct. at 1798. This difference does not appear to have had any substantive effect on the
decisions, though it may suggest that the first prong has atrophied into a mere formality while
emphasizing that the more relevant prongs parallel the intermediate scrutiny test used in other
constitutional contexts. Evidently only three cases, all predating Central Hudson, were resolved
at the threshold. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. I, 12-13 (1979) (rejecting challenge to state
prohibition on the use of trade names by optometrists: "Because these ill-defined associations
of trade names with price and quality information can be manipulated by the users of trade
names, there is a significant possibility that trade names will be used to mislead the public.");
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978) (upholding prohibition on in-person
attorney solicitation); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 388 (1973) ("We have no doubt that a newspaper constitutionally could be forbidden to
publish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes.").
68. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
69. [d. at 569.
70. [d. ("[T]he Commission's laudable concern over the equity and efficiency of
appellant's rates does not provide a constitutionally adequate reason for restricting protected
speech.").
71. [d. at 569-70.
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to regulating advertising, something short of an outright prohibition,
could not accomplish its legitimate ends.72
In the years following the Central Hudson decision, it became
apparent that the four-prong test was ambiguous and difficult to
apply.73 To some extent, of course, the questions posed by the test are
not entirely distinct from one another. Moreover, even if the four parts
are carefully differentiated, the Court's application of any particular
prong has proven to be quite unpredictable. Both before and after
Central Hudson, controls on lawyer advertising have been the most
frequent subject of commercial free speech review. 74 In one such case,
the Court reviewed a rule which prohibited attorneys from, among other
things, including in their advertisements any information outside of that
specified in ten limited categories. 75 The Court concluded that there
was no substantial state interest to justify the restrictions, and that there
was nothing inherently misleading about the type of advertisement in
question, despite the fact that it deviated from the prescribed formae 6
Moreover, the Court noted that the absolute prohibitions set forth in the
rule were not the only alternatives which would effectively accomplish
the state's asserted goal of preventing consumer deception. 77
By contrast, in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,78 the
Court upheld a state professional responsibility rule prohibiting
deceptive advertising.79 The rule required the disclosure of attorneys'
fee information in print advertisements. In applying Central Hudson's

72. See id.; see also id. at 565 ("The State cannot ... completely suppress information
when narrower restrictions on expression would serve its interests as well.").
73. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 63, at 631; Mary B. Nutt, Recent Development,
Trends in First Amendment Protection of Commercial Speech, 41 VAND. L. REV. 173, 189-205
(1988).
74. See, e.g., Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990)
(plurality); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S.
350 (1977); see also Sandra L. DeGraw & Bruce W. Burton, Lawyer Discipline and "Disclosure
Advertising": Towards a New Ethos, 72 N.C. L. REV. 351 (1994); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et
aI., Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed to Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084 (1983).
75. In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191, 194-96 (1982). For example, attorneys were prohibited
from listing the tribunals before which they were admitted to practice. See id. at 198.
76. See id. at 205-07.
77. Id. at 206.
78. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
79. See id. at 650-53, 655-56. The Court also found that it was improper to reprimand the
attorney in question for his use of a non-deceptive illustration and his offer of attorney services
regarding a specific legal problem in a print advertisement. See id. at 641-49. Both rules banning
these practices were held unconstitutional under a Central Hudson analysis.
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fourth prong, the Court demanded only that the state regulation be
"reasonably related" to the asserted governmental interest.8o
We reject appellant's contention that we should subject
disclosure requirements to a strict "least restrictive means"
analysis under which they must be struck down if there are
other means by which the State's purposes may be served.
Although we have subjected outright prohibitions on speech
to such analysis, all our discussions of restraints on com
mercial speech have recommended disclosure requirements
as one of the acceptable less restrictive alternatives to actual
suppression of speech.8!
The Court feared that the average consumer of legal services, when
reading an advertisement about a contingency fee arrangement stating
that no "fees" would be incurred unless the suit was successful, would
not understand that court "costs" might still be incurred. 82
During the late 1980s, the Court appeared to embrace an even
weaker interpretation of the nexus prongs of Central Hudson, thereby
significantly diluting the protections accorded commercial speech. In
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism CO.,83 for example, it
reviewed a statute which prohibited casino advertising directed at
residents of Puerto Rico but permitted such advertising when aimed at
non-residents. Initially, the Court noted that casino gambling was lawful
in Puerto Rico, that the advertising in question was not misleading, and
that the government had a substantial interest in protecting the welfare
of its citizens. 84 In applying the nexus requirements of the Central
Hudson analysis, the Court showed significant deference to the Puerto
Rican legislature's conclusion that the advertising ban would discourage
gambling among residents, stating that the legislature's choice was a
"reasonable one.,,8S Under the fourth prong, the Court simply stated

80. Id. at 651.
81. Id. at 651-52 n.14.
82. See id. at 652-53.
83. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
84. See id. at 340-41.
85. See id. at 342. Posadas attracted a great deal of academic criticism. See, e.g., Donald
E. Lively, The Supreme Court and Commercial Speech: New Words with an Old Message, 72
MINN. L. REv. 289,299-304 (1987); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Constitutional Future of the Bill
ofRights: A Closer Look at Commercial Speech and State Aid to Religiously Affiliated Schools,
65 N.C. L. REV. 917, 923-29 (1987); Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the
Architecture ofthe First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1181, 1182 & n.l (1988) (characteriz
ing Posadas as irreconcilable with Central Hudson). But see Daniel H. Lowenstein, "Too Much
PUff': Persuasion, Paternalism, and Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1230-31
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that the ban was no more extensive than necessary to accomplish its
goal because it applied only to Puerto Rican residents,86 adding that it
was the state's prerogative to decide whether an alternative approach
(such as requiring warnings against gambling) might be as effective. 87
The Supreme Court's decisions from the last few years suggest,
however, substantially greater protection for commercial speech. In City
of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,88 for example, it considered
the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance prohibiting the distribution
of commercial handbills from newsracks on public property. 89 The
Court held that the City had failed to demonstrate a "reasonable fit," as
required under the latter two steps of the Central Hudson test, between
its asserted interests in safety and esthetics and its prohibition on
newsracks for free commercial magazines but not for newspapers.90
The Court declared the ordinance unconstitutional partly because the
original rationale for its passage was no longer cogent. 91
Similarly, in Edenfield v. Fane,92 the majority found that the State
of Florida had failed to demonstrate a reasonable fit between its broad
prophylactic rule against personal solicitation of clients by certified

(1988) (arguing that Posadas was consistent with the Court's differing treatment of informational
and non-informational advertising).
86. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 343; see also Board of Trustees of the State Univ. v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469, 475-77 (1989) (upholding rule barring representatives of all but a few types of
businesses from operating on state university campuses because the government had a substantial
interest in promoting a safe, secure educational atmosphere and preventing exploitation of
students by commercial enterprises). After passing over the third prong of the test in a relatively
cursory fashion, the Court in Fox proceeded to analyze the rule in detail under the fourth prong,
reiterating that it "requires something short of a least-restrictive-means standard." Id. at 476-77;
see also Albert P. Mauro, Jr., Comment, Commercial Speech After Posadas and Fox: A Rational
Basis Wolf in Intermediate Sheep's Clothing, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1931, 1950 (1992) (,'Taken
together, Posadas and, Fox represent a substantial reduction in the protection afforded
commercial speech.").
87. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 344 ("The legislature could conclude, as it apparently did
here, that residents of Puerto Rico are already aware of the risks of casino gambling, yet would
nevertheless be induced by widespread advertising to engage in such potentially harmful
conduct."); see also Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U,S. 490, 509 (1981) (plurality)
("hesitat[ing] to disagree with the accumulated, commonsense judgments of local lawmakers").
88. 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
89. See id. at 1508.
90. See id. at 1510.
91. The Court explained that the ordinance "was an outdated prohibition against the
distribution of any commercial handbills on public property. It was enacted long before any
concern about newsracks developed. Its apparent purpose was to prevent the kind of visual blight
caused by littering, rather than any harm associated with permanent, freestanding dispensing
devices." Id. (adding that the City's action would have eliminated only 62 out of almost 2,000
newsracks).
92. 113 S. Ct. 1792'(1993).
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public accountants and its conceded interests in ensuring that such
communications were not false, misleading, or coercive. The Court
appeared to strengthen prong three of the Central Hudson analysis,
holding that the challenged regulation must advance the government
interest "in a direct and material way."93 According to the Court in
Edenfield, the state "must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real
and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material de
gree.,,94 The Court declined to accept the state's assertion that in-person
solicitation was obviously harmful and instead required the State to
supply evidence to bolster its c1aim.95
In United States v. Edge Broadcasting CO.,96 by contrast, the Court
showed significant deference in evaluating the constitutionality of a
1934 federal statute prohibiting the broadcasting of lottery advertising
on radio and television stations. The statutory prohibition applied only
to stations licensed in those states which did not sponsor lotteries.97
After assuming that the advertising was not misleading, and noting that
Congress' goal of protecting the interests of nonlottery states was
substantial,98 the Court turned to the nexus elements of the Central
Hudson analysis. Under prong three, it found that the ban directly
advanced the government's interest in accommodating conflicting state
lottery policies.99 Applying prong four in a similarly cursory fashion,

93. Id. at 1798.
94. Id. at 1800; see also Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Business & Professional Regulation,
114 S. Ct. 2084,2086-91 (1994) (overturning a Board of Accountancy order censuring one of
its members for including references in her law office letterhead and advertising to her licenses
as a certified public accountant (CPA) and certified financial planner (CFP)). In Ibanez, the
Court found that there was no specific evidence that the use of the CPA designation in
advertising was misleading, and it also emphasized that the state had failed to present any
evidence that anyone had been misled by Ibanez's truthful representation of her CPA credential.
Id. at 2089 ("[A]s long as Ibanez holds an active CPA license from the Board we cannot
imagine how consumers can be misled by her truthful representation to that effect."); see also
id. at 2090 (finding that the CFP designation was truthful and not misleading, and concluding
that the Board had failed to satisfy its burden to "demonstrate that the harms it recites are real
and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
95. See Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1800-01; see also FCC v. Beach Communications, 113
S. Ct. 2096, 2102 (1993) (explaining that only on minimum rationality review maya legislative
choice "be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data").
96. 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
.
97. See id. at 2701.
98. See id. at 2703. The relatively greater attention to the second prong of the Central
Hudson analysis in this case, which entailed a more precise definition of the governmental
interest underlying the statute, suggests that the Court will focus on different prongs of the
Central Hudson test in different situations.
99. See id. at 2704. Strangely, in discussing how the statute directly advanced the asserted
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the Court concluded that the ban was reasonable under the intermediate
scrutiny standard. 100
Over the fifteen years since it announced the Central Hudson test,
the United States Supreme Court has become increasingly critical of
state and local restrictions on commercial speech, though Edge
Broadcasting suggested greater deference in its review of federal
statutes. 101 Taken together, the Court's decisions demonstrate that the
judiciary will continue to scrutinize assertions that a challenged
restriction actually advances a substantial government interest, typically
(but not exclusively) an interest in preventing false, misleading, or
coercive commercial speech. To be sure, the Justices did not speak
unanimously in rendering these decisions, and the divergent outcomes
may be somewhat difficult to reconcile, but the bottom line is a
continued recognition of the value of commercial speech.
C. The Supreme Court's Resolution of the Coors Litigation

In one of its latest commercial free speech decisions, Rubin v. Coors
Brewing CO.,I02 the Court provided important insights about this still
relatively young First Amendment doctrine. In 1987, the Adolph Coors
Company petitioned BATF for permission to include the alcohol
content, in terms of a numerical percentage, on the labels of its beer

governmental goals, the Court cited examples of other possible statutory schemes which would
have had a more overinclusive effect (such as banning all lottery advertising nationwide, or
forbidding stations in lottery states from carrying lottery advertisements if their signals reached
neighboring nonlottery states). See id. This type of argument ordinarily is considered under the
fourth prong of the Centralliudson analysis.
100. See id. at 2705. In determining that the statute was no more extensive than necessary
to achieve the governmental interest, the Court discussed the application of the restriction to
Edge Broadcasting, concluding that "applying the restriction to a broadcaster such as Edge
directly advances the governmental interest in enforcing the restriction in non lottery States, while
not interfering with the policy of lottery States." [d.
101. [d. at 2704. This special deference accorded to congressional factfinding has parallels
in the Court's previous Equal Protection jurisprudence. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547, 565 (1990) ("[R]ace-conscious classifications adopted by Congress to address
racial and ethnic discrimination are subject to a different standard than such classifications
prescribed by state and local governments."); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,472 (1980)
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (noting that the Court is "bound to approach [its] task with appropriate
deference to the Congress, a co-equal branch"); cf Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469.
491-92 (1989) (showing less deference in reviewing municipal ordinance). In a 1995 decision,
however, the Court overturned Metro Broadcasting, holding that even federally-mandated
programs that use race-based classifications are subject to strict scrutiny and must be narrowly
tailored to meet a compelling governmental objective. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113-14 (1995).
102. 115 s. Ct. 1585 (1995).
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products, but the Bureau denied the petition. t03 As previously ex
plained, the FAAA prohibits the disclosure of alcohol content in the
labeling of malt beverages unless otherwise required by state law. 104
Coors responded by filing a complaint in federal district court against
BATF and the Secretary of the Treasury, claiming that its proposed.
labeling and advertising were protected under the First Amendment.
Department of Justice lawyers representing the defendants conceded that
the challenged restrictions were unconstitutional,105 but the United
States House of Representatives intervened to defend the statute, ~guing
that the prohibition was necessary to further a substantial 'governmental
interest in preventing strength wars among brewers of malt beverag
es. 106 The district court held that the statute violated the First Amend
ment and enjoined BATF from enforcing the relevant provisions of the
.
statute and implementing regulations against Coors.107
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
agreed that Coors' proposed alcohol content labeling was protected
commercial speech but added that the asserted government interest was
substantial.108 Because it fo~nd genuine issues of material fact
concerning the question of whether the regulation directly advanced the
government's interests, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the
district court for further proceedings. 109 .After the district court again
held for Coors, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding that BATF's
regulation did not advance the government's interests in a direct and
material way because the government had failed to show any relation
ship between alcohol content disclosure in labeling and strength

103, See Letter from Bruce L. Weininger, Chief, Industry Compliance Div" BATF, to
Adolph Coors Co. (May 4, 1987), reprinted in Petition for Certiorari at 73a, Coors (No. 93
1631).
104. 27 U.S.C. § 205(e)(2) (l994). The FAAA also prohibits the disclosure of alcohol
content in advertising. See id. § 205(f)(2). Initially, the district court decided that both the
labeling and advertising restrictions were unconstitutional. See Adolph Coors Co. v. Baker, Civ.
No. 87-Z-977 (D. Colo. May 31, 1989), reprinted in Petition for Certiorari at 43a, Coors (No.
93-1631). After remand, however, Coors apparently did not pursue its challenge to the
advertising prohibition, and the district court only held the labeling prohibition to be
unconstitutional. See Adolph Coors Co. v. Baker, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18156, at *17 (D.
Colo. Oct. 29, 1992), afJ'd, Adolph Coors Co. v. Bentsen, 2 F.3d 355 (10th Cir. 1993), afJ'd,
115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995). The implicitly rejected challenge to the advertising prohibition was
never pressed on appeal. See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1588.
105. See Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady, 944 F.2d 1543, 1546 (lOth Cir. 1991) (describing
district court's unpublished decision).
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 1547-49.
109. [d. at 1554.
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wars.11O Indeed, the court speculated that most consumers would use
alcohol content information to select beer with lower rather than higher
alcohol content. III
Thereupon, the Supreme Court granted the government's petition for
certiorari. 1I2 In a unanimous decision, the Court affirmed the Tenth
Circuit's judgment. 1I3 From the outset of the litigation, the government
admitted that the proposed alcohol content disclosure related to a lawful
activity and was not misleading.114 Before the Court, the government
asserted two main interests to justify its labeling ban. First, it reiterated
the claim that the statute prevents brewers from engaging in strength
wars.1I5 Second, and apparently for the first time in the course of the
litigation, the government argued that the prohibition facilitates state
regulation of alcoholic beverages. 116 Regarding this latter claim, the
Court concluded that states already enjoy adequate authority to ban the
disclosure of alcohol content and that, therefore, the federal government
lacks any substantial interest in preserving the states' authority.1I7 The

110. Adolph Coors Co. v. Bentsen, 2 F.3d 355, 358-59 (10th Cir. 1993), ajJ'd, [15 S. Ct.
1585 (1995).
Ill. Id. at 359 (noting that "the vast majority of consumers. . . value taste and lower
calories-both of which are adversely affected by increased alcohol strength"). It should be
remembered, however, that BATF permitted brewers to make "low" or "reduced" alcohol
content claims in the labeling of their products. See 27 C.F.R. § 7.26(b) (1993).
112. 114 S. Ct. 2671 (1994). The numerous amicus briefs filed on both sides of the issue
attest to the interest generated by this case. Briefs in support of Coors were filed by the
Association of National Advertisers and Public Citizen, among others. Briefs in support of the
government were filed by the National Governors' Association and the Center for Science in the
Public Interest, among others.
113. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1594 (1995). Only Justice Stevens
wrote separately. Id. at 1594-97 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that alcohol
content disclosure restrictions should be evaluated under the test for pure rather than commercial
speech).
114. Id. at 1590. Even so, one amicus made the argument that alcohol content disclosure
is inherently misleading. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Submitted by the Center for Science in the
Public Interest in Support of Petitioners at 5, Coors (No. 93-1631) ("While technically true, such
labeling would deceptively make beer appear to be less intoxicating than wine and liquor when
in fact beer is not" because of its larger average serving size.).
115. See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1590. Although the significance of this interest in the abstract
went largely uncontested, Coors argued that the fear of strength wars was not in fact the true
rationale underlying the governmental policy. See id.
116. Id. at 1591 (analogizing to United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696
(1993)).
117. Id. ("Even if the Federal Government possessed the broad authority to facilitate state
powers, in this case the Government has offered nothing that suggests that States are in need of
federal assistance. States clearly possess ample authority to ban the disclosure of alcohol
content-subject, of course, to the same First Amendment restrictions that apply to the Federal
Government.").
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Court agreed, however, that the government's interest in preventing
strength wars was substantial and proceeded to apply the nexus
components of the Central Hudson test to the labeling restriction.
The Court characterized the last two steps in the Central Hudson test
as involving "a consideration of the 'fit' bet~een the legislature's ends
and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.,,118 After an examina
tion of the FAAA's regulatory scheme, the Court concluded that the
government's approach was irrational.119 For example, the statute
prohibits alcohol content labeling on beers, but permits it on some
wines, and affirmatively requires it on distilled liquors and other
wines. l20 The Court also noted an inconsistency in the treatment of
labeling and advertising. Alcohol content may not be disclosed in
labeling unless required by state law, but statements of alcohol content
in advertising are prohibited only in States which affrrmatively forbid
such statements. 121 Since alcohol content in beer advertising is
prohibited in only eighteen states,l22 much of the country can be
exposed to advertisements which legally disclose alcohol content.
Because advertising is a far more powerful mechanism than labeling for
influencing consumers' brand choices,123 the fact that alcohol content
may be disclosed in advertising in so many states, but not in labeling,
seems to run counter to the government's asserted interest in preventing
strength wars.
Furthermore, the Court noted that the government's assertions about
the likelihood of strength wars arising from alcohol content labeling

118. Id. (quoting Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 341
(1986».

119. See id. at 1593 ("[T]he irrationality of this unique and puzzling regulatory framework
ensures that the labeling ban will fail to achieve [the government's] end."); see also City of
Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2044 (1994) ("Exemptions from an otherwise legitimate
regulation ... may diminish the credibility of the government's rationale for'I:estricting speech
in the first place."); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691,715 (1984) (noting that
the "selective approach" to regulation "suggests limits on the substantiality of the [government's]
interests"). But cf. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52-53 (1986)
(rejecting claim that speech restriction was impermissibly underinclusive for singling out adult
theaters).
120. See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1592. BA1F's implementing regulations were previously
discussed in Part I.A.
121. See 27 U.S.C. § 205(t)(2) (1994); 27 C.F.R. § 7.50 (1994).
122. Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1592.
123. See DAVID N. MARTIN, ROMANCING THE BRAND: THE POWER OF ADVERTISING AND
How TO USE IT 153 (1989); Anthony Tennant, Creating Brand Power, in BRAND POWER 33,
35 (paul Stobart ed., 1994). But cf. JOSEPH C. FISHER, ADVERTISING, ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION,
AND ABUSE: A WORLDWIDE SURVEY 142 (1993) (finding "[n]o experimental evidence" that
advertising affects overall levels of alcohol consumption).
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consist mainly of "anecdotal evidence and educated guesses.,,124 The
FAAA's legislative history on this matter was scant, and the government
demonstrated in its brief only a weak empirical connection between
alcohol content labeling and the threat of strength wars in the current
beer market. 125 This demanding search for evidence of a nexus stands
in marked contrast to the traditional deference extended by the Court to
congressional judgments of this sort. 126 Indeed, Coors suggests even
less deference under the third prong than was extended to state and local
governments in some of the earlier cases. 127 Thus, the lack of evidence
to support the asserted link between labeling and strength wars,
combined with the irrationality of the regulatory scheme for alcoholic
beverage labeling and advertising, led the Court to conclude that the
FAAA's labeling restriction failed under Central Hudson's third
prong. 128
Finally, in dicta, the Court opined that the prohibition on the
disclosure of alcohol content in labeling would also fail the fourth prong
of the test. Coors suggested a series of less restrictive alternatives for
achieving the governmental interest, such as prohibiting promotional

124. Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1593.
125. See id. Coors had argued that such consumer behavior occurs only in the malt liquor
segment of the market, but the initial marketing experience with ice beer appears to contradict
this argument. Pending the outcome of the Coors litigation, the government stayed enforcement
of Section 205(e)(2) of the FAAA. See supra note 8. Ice beers were first introduced in the
market after this stay of enforcement, so they are the first beer products to include alcohol
content information on their labels. A recent article suggests that some consumers will
intentionally purchase higher alcohol content beer if this information is disclosed. See Anheuser
Busch to Revamp Its Ice Draft Beer Product, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1995, at B9 ("Stung by
competitive products with slightly more kick, [Anheuser-Busch] said it is reluctantly increasing
the alcohol content to 5.5% from 5% to match other ice beers ...."); see also Adolph Coors
Co. v. Brady, 944 F.2d 1543, 1549 (lOth Cir. 1991) (noting Coors' admission that its primary
motivation for disclosing alcohol content was to dispel public perception that its beers are
weaker than competing brands).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696,2703-05 (1993)
(upholding 1934 federal statute which prohibited broadcasts of lottery advertisements); San
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 539 (1987)
("Congress reasonably could conclude that most commercial uses of the Olympic words and
symbols are likely to be confusing."); supra note 101 (discussing Equal Protection decisions).
127. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 342-44 (1986)
(deferring to legislative judgment that casino advertising restrictions would limit gambling by
citizens); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 509 (1981) (plurality)
("hesitat[ing] to disagree with the accumulated, common-sense judgments of local lawmakers");
see also City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986) ('The First
Amendment does not require a city ... to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent
of that already generated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is
reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.").
128. Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1592 (quoting Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1798).
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efforts which emphasize alcohol strength, limiting the labeling ban to
malt liquors, or capping the maximum alcohol content of beers.129
Accepting these alternatives as reasonable, the Court concluded that the
regulation was not adequately tailored to the attainment of the
government's goal. 130
A few months after it decided Coors, tp.e Court once again addressed
the issue of appropriate commercial speech protection for attorney
advertising. In The Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,l3l it considered
the constitutionality of a prohibition against targeted direct mail
solicitation of accident victims or their families within thirty days of an
accident or disaster. In a sharply divided decision that turned largely on
conflicting assessments of the evidence offered in support of the asserted
link between ends and means, the Court upheld the ban.132 Relying on
the extensive record submitted by The Florida Bar in support of the
rule,133 and purporting to follow the gloss on the nexus requirements

129. See id. at 1593. The Court soon may have the opportunity to elaborate more directly
on the fourth prong. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. State of Rhode Island, 39 F.3d 5, 7-8 (1st Cir.
1994) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to state statutes which forbid any alcoholic beverage
price advertising except at the point of sale), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1821 (1995). The First
Circuit held that the ban on price advertising would directly advance the state's substantial
interest in promoting temperance. See id. at 7-8 (noting that, although there was conflicting
expert testimollY and no empirical evidence, "there would seem inherent merit in the State's
contention that competipve price advertising would lower prices, and that with lower prices there
would be more sales," adding that "[a]dvertising must be generally productive, or so much
money would not be spent on it"). Moreover, the court thought that state advertising restrictions
deserved a presumption of validity because of the Twenty-First Amendment. See id. Finally,
under Central Hudson's fourth prong, the First Circuit dismissed the argument that the same
goal could be achieved more directly by setting minimum prices or increasing the sales tax on
alcoholic beverages. See id. at 7 ("[T]he State is entitled to a reasonable choice."); see also infra
note 233; Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305, l313-17 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding
city ordinance prohibiting alcohol advertising on billboards in certain locations), petition for cert.
filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Oct. 27, 1995) (No. 95-685).
130. Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1593; see also id. at 1597 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)
("Any 'interest' in restricting the flow of accurate information because of the perceived danger
of that knowledge is anathema to the First Amendment ...."). Another alternative mentioned
by Justice Stevens, id. at 1594-95, is a "counter speech" approach, see Central Hudson, 447 U.S.
at 571, such as the warning statement recently mandated by Congress. See Alcoholic Beverage
Labeling Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, tit. VIII, § 8001(a)(3), 102 Stat. 4518 (codified at
27 U.S.C. §§ 213-219 (1994»; see also Steve Younger, Comment, Alcoholic Beverage
Advertising on the Ainvaves: Alternatives to a Ban or Counteradvertising, 34 UCLA L. REV.
1139, 1190 (1987) ("Congress should seek to burden the product rather than the medium in
which it is advertised.").
131. 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
132. See id. at 2376-81.
133. See id. at 2377-78. The Florida Bar submitted a lengthy summary of its two-year study
of lawyer advertising and solicitation containing both statistical and anecdotal data to
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announced in Coors, the majority concluded that the limited advertising
prohibition "targets a concrete, nonspeculative harm.,,134 Thus, the
Supreme Court's decisions from the latest Term demand some proof that
government restrictions on commercial speech directly advance a
substantial interest, but the precise quantum of evidence required
remains unclear.
III.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PRODUCT LABELING CONTROLS

The Court's decision in Coors is important for a number of reasons.
At a basic level, the unanimous decision to strike down the labeling
restriction confirms the notion that commercial speech receives some
meaningful protection under the First Amendment. The backsliding
apparent in Posadas, for instance, was merely a temporary aberration
and not a signal that the Court was reconsidering the validity of this
new category of protected speech. On the contrary, the noticeable
absence in Coors of the traditional deference extended to Congress
suggests a heightened concern for commercial speech. In part, the Court
appeared to be responding to a problem of regulatory obsolescence. 135
In doing so, it put some teeth into the nexus requirements of the Central

demonstrate that the public views direct-mail solicitation of accident victims and their families
as intrusive and reflecting poorly on the legal profession. See id. The dissenting members of the
Court took particular issue with the majority's acceptance of this study as evidence of a nexus.
See id. at 2384 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("This document includes no actual surveys, few
indications of sample size or selection procedures, no explanations of methodology, and no
discussion of excluded results.").
134. [d. at 2378 (emphasizing that no effort had been made to refute The Florida Bar's
study). In contrast, the Court in Coors regarded the government's fear of strength wars as highly
speculative, both because BATF failed to offer anything other than "anecdotal evidence and
educated guesses" in support of a nexus and because Coors had made some attempt to refute the
claimed connection. See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1593; see also Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486
U.S. 466, 475 (1988).
135. See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1590-93; City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113
S. Ct. 1505, 1510 (1993) ("The ordinance on which [the City] relied was an outdated prohibition
against the distribution of any commercial handbills on public property ...."); Nashville, C.
& S.L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 415 (1935) (HA statute valid when enacted may become
invalid by change in the conditions to which it is applied."). But cf Walters v. National Ass'n
of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 319-35 (1985) (rejecting due process and First
Amendment challenges to civil war era statute which capped attorneys' fees in veterans' benefits
claim proceedings at $10); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60,71 (1983) ("[T]he
insufficiency of the original motivation does not diminish other interests that the restriction may
now serve."). Although the Court in Radiation Survivors suggested that "more deference is
called for [where] the statute in question for all relevant purposes has been on the books for over
120 years," 473 U.S. at 319, it also explained that Congress had recently, though ambiguously,
reaffirmed its interest in preventing the unnecessary diversion of veterans' benefits to attorneys.
See id. at 322.
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Hudson test, making the third prong more than a formality. Finally,
Coors represents the Court's fIrst commercial speech decision directly
to address product labeling controls. As such, it may have important
implications for other federal limitations on the inclusion of truthful
information in labeling.
A. Health Claims in Food Labeling
The FDA's preambles to both the nutrient content claim and health
message regulations include a detailed response to industry complaints
that the proposed restrictions would violate the First Amendment. 136
The mere inclusion of these lengthy defenses is telling. Close scrutiny
of the FDA's legal arguments reveals, however, the weakness of the
Agency's constitutional position, a weakness compounded by the
Court's intervening decisions from the last few Terms. Although the
FDA apparently took comfort in the fact that Congress specifIcally
directed it to promulgate many of these new rules, \37 this cannot
insulate the regulations or, for that matter, the statute itself from
searching judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment.
A few commentators have applauded the FDA's nutrition labeling
requirements as consonant with First Amendment ideals because they
promote the availability of information that market forces otherwise
would not provide in sufficient quantities:138 Even if one agrees,
however, that government prompting sometimes may be necessary to
ensure that consumers receive useful information about products, overly
stringent limitations on the provision of truthful 139 information work

136. See 58 Fed. Reg. 2302, 2392-97 (1993) (nutrient content claims); 58 Fed. Reg. 2478,
2524-28 (1993) (health claims); see also 59 Fed. Reg. 395, 421-24 (1994) (health claims for
dietary supplements). This section of the Article focuses on the preamble accompanying the
health claims regulations but includes any significant additional points made in the other two.
137. See, e.g., 58 Fed. Reg. at 2396. Although an agency cannot decline to implement a
statutory provision which it regards as unconstitutional, it must take First Amendment issues into
account when choosing between permissible interpretations of a statute. See National Treasury
Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 986 F.2d 537, 539-40 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
138. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Infonning America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First
Amendment, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 653, 662 (1993); see also Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of
Collective Speech: A Theory ofProtected Communic~tions by Organizations, Communities, and
the State, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1229, 1244-48 (1991); Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without
Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 568-79 (1991).
139. It is, of course, inaccurate to speak in terms of scientific "truth." See Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113. S. Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993) ("Scientific conclusions are
subject to perpetual revision."). Unlike objectively verifiable statements of alcohol content,
biomedical knowledge is contingent and rapidly changing. See Bert Black et aI., Science and the
Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Searchfor Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEx. L. REV. 715, 753
66 (1994). Even so, if properly qualified (see, e.g., text accompanying supra note 27), health
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to undermine the "marketplace of ideas" promoted by the First
Amendment. Federal regulators, in their zeal to protect the public from
potentially misleading labeling or advertising, should not unduly
interfere in that marketplace or squelch information concerning
consumer products. Concern over individual abuses, which undoubtedly
exist,14O should not inspire overbroad restrictions that impede the flow
of accurate and useful information. In light of the Coors decision, the
FDA's broad restrictions on health claims in food labeling may be
vulnerable to constitutional challenge. 141
1. Is Food Labeling Protected Commercial Speech?

In the preamble accompanying its final regulations, the FDA
suggested that health claims on food labels do not constitute protected
commercial speech at all. 142 Courts have, however, clearly regarded
information or claims appearing in product labeling as commercial
speech.143 Although it was not asked to decide the issue, the Supreme
Court in Coors noted that "[b loth parties agree that the information on
beer labels constitutes commercial speech" and proceeded to subject the
labeling ban in question to a Central Hudson analysis. l44 By contrast,
some have argued that, because they contain scientific information of

claims can be regarded as no less truthful than purportedly quantitative measurements. Cf FTC
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 42 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that
quantitative "low tar" cigarette claims based on an unrecognized testing method were deceptive).
140. See, e.g., Kim Painter, Some Food Labels Branded Deceptive, USA TODAY, Aug. 2,
1995, at lD.
141. Several challenges to the health claims regulations applicable to dietary supplements
are currently pending. See, e.g., Wellife Prods. v. Shalala, 52 F.3d 357, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(transferring constitutional challenge to district court); Mineral Resources Int'l v. Shalala, 53
F.3d 305, 308-09 (lOth Cir. 1995) (same); National Council for Improved Health v. Shalala, 893
F. Supp. 1512, 1517-20 (D. Utah 1995) (rejecting First Amendment challenge). Producers of
wine have hinted at a challenge to BATF's absolute prohibition against health claims on certain
alcoholic beverages notwithstanding growing scientific evidence that moderate consumption of
red wine in particular may reduce the risk of heart disease. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Wine
Institute in Support of Respondent at 5-9, Coors (No. 93-1631); see also Group Wants Alcohol
Labels to List Benefits, GAINESVILLE SUN, May 10, 1995, at 9A.
142. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 2525 ("[L]abeling does not fall clearly within the bounds of
commercial speech.").
143. See, e.g., Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady, 944 F.2d 1543, 1546 (lOth Cir. 1991) ("Product
labels, which are part of a firm's marketing plan to provide certain information to the consumer,
also constitute commercial speech."), aff'd after remand, 2 F.3d 355 (10th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 115
S. Ct. 1585 (1995); see also Hornell Brewing Co. v. Brady, 819 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (E.D.N.Y.
1993); United States v. General Nutrition, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 556, 562 (W.D.N. Y. 1986).
144. Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1589-93; cf Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 351 (1948)
(In broadly construing statutory term "labeling," the Court observed that "[e]very labeling is in
a sense an advertisement.").
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clear public interest, health claims are entitled to greater protection
under the First Amendment than mere commercial speech.145 But the
FDA categorically rejected this notion. l46 Even if health messages in
food labeling are considered nothing more than commercial speech,
these promotional statements are entitled to some First Amendment
protections so long as they are not false or misleading.
The FDA conceded that "parts of the [NLEA] and these regulations
may have an incidental effect on speech in a narrowly defined area,,,147
but it argued that the government did not thereby forfeit its power to
regulate e.conomic activities over which it exerts "extensive regulatory
authority.,,148 Although poorly articulated, the Agency may have been
arguing that the greater power (in this case, the power to' prohibit the
sale of particular products) includes the lesser power (here, to prohibit
certain labeling claims about such productS),149 a view championed by
the majority in Posadas. ISO Central Hudson does not, of course,

145. See, e.g., 58 Fed. Reg. at 2527; Martin H. Redish, Product Health Claims and the
First Amendment: Scientific Expression and the Twilight Zone ofCommercial Speech, 43 V AND.
L. REV. 1433, 1437 (1990) (USuch speech appropriately is viewed not as commercial, but rather
as fully protected scientific expression."); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463
U.S. 60, 69 (1983) (noting that where Ua speaker desires to convey truthful information relevant
to important social issues ... the First Amendment interest served by such speech [is]
paramount").
146. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 2527 (UA label is not entitled to the protection due noncommercial
speech simply because it contains a discussion of an issue of broad public interest.").
147. [d. at 2525.
148. [d. (noting that the government '''does not lose its power to regulate commercial
activity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a component of the activity'" (quoting
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978))). The holding in Ohralik does not,
however, support the FDA's contention that speech in areas of extensive regulation is accorded
no constitutional protection. Although it had not yet- developed the Central Hudson test, the
Court clearly approached lawyer solicitation as a form of commercial speech. See Ohralik, 436
U.S. at 455-57.
149. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 2524-25 ('The [NLEA] amended the act to permit certain
information about the relationship of nutrients in food and disease to appear on a food label
without misbranding the food under section 403 of the act or transforming it into a drug under
section 201(g)(I)(B) of the act. The regulations implementing these amendments thus permit
more information on food labels than has previously been allowed under the act."); see also
Kellogg Co. v. Mattox, 763 F. Supp. 1369, 1381 (N.D. Tex.) (''Texas could ban the sale of all
food products containing psyllium, and Kellogg could not claim a free speech right to sell such
a product. ... A requirement that the [health] claims be removed, in order to sell the product,
is certainly less restrictive than a flat prohibition of the sale of the product."), affd mem., 940
F.2d 1530 (5th Cir. 1991).
150. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986)
(though still applying the Central Hudson test). For a well-reasoned critique of this logic, see
Sylvia A. Law, Addiction, Autonomy, and Advertising, 77 IOWA L. REV. 909, 938-42 (1992);
see also Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1589-90 n.2 (rejecting government's suggestion that it has "broader
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entirely divest agencies of the power to regulate whenever speech is
impacted, but it does place a heightened burden of justification on the
government in such circumstances. Coors itself should put to rest any
claim that agencies are free to subject companies in heavily regulated
industries to whatever restrictions on the disclosure of information that
seem necessary in the pursuit of their delegated responsibilities. lSI
2. Are Health Claims Inherently Misleading?
Seemingly recognizing the weakness of its first line argument that
food labeling is not protected commercial speech, the FDA proceeded
to apply the Central Hudson test. IS2 Under the first prong,IS3 the
speech must concern a lawful activity and not be misleading. The
Agency asserted that health claims are "inherently misleading."I54

latitude to regulate speech that promotes socially harmful activities"); City of Lakewood v. Plain
Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 763 (1988). Even so, in its recent proposal to restrict
advertising for tobacco products, the FDA observed that it has "greater leeway" to regulate
"speech with regard to socially harmful activities." 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,355 (1995) (adding
that Coors is not contrary).
151. The FDA cited a number of decisions for the proposition that companies in heavily
regulated industries cannot object to incidental restrictions on speech. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 2525;
see also The Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2381 (1995) ("Particularly
because the standards and conduct of state-licensed lawyers have traditionally been subject to
extensive regulation by the States, it is all the more appropriate that we limit our scruti
ny ...."). These decisions are easily distinguished from the FDA's health claims restrictions.
See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 n.5 (1985)
(plurality) (dictum describing varieties of commercial speech); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886,912 (1982) (dictum in case involving politically-motivated boycott, noting
that regulation of economic activity having an incidental effect on speech is permissible if there
is a strong government interest at stake); SEC v. Wall Street Publishing Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365,
373-74 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (conceding that "it would be an overstatement to assert that the First
Amendment does not limit regulation in the securities field," the court upheld the SEC's power
to enforce a statutory disclosure requirement to prevent misunderstandings by investors), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1066 (1989); SEC v. Suter, 732 F.2d 1294, 1299 (7th Cir. 1984) (rejecting,
after applying the Central Hudson test, challenge to temporary injunction issued by the SEC
against an investment adviser's blatantly false advertisements); see also infra note 155
(distinguishing lower court decisions which rejected First Amendment challenges to the FDA's
regulation of food labeling).
152. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 2526-27. The FDA did acknowledge, for instance, that any dietary
guidance statements appearing on labels would be commercial speech, noting that "[IJabeling
statements on food products intended for sale would clearly appear in the context of a
commercial transaction and would 'propose' such a transaction." [d. at 2527.
153. As noted previously, supra note 67, the Court's most recent opinions seemingly
modify the four-part Central Hudson analysis to create a threshold test followed by three prongs.
Nonetheless, for the sake of clarity, this section abides by the four-part framework originally set
out in Central Hudson.
154. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 2526 (noting that "particular attributes of health claims on the
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Citing a number of lower court decisions,155 the FDA argued that it
freely may limit the content of product labeling under the statutory
prohibitions against the misbranding of food products. 156 Ironically,
one reason that the Agency viewed health claims as inherently mislead
ing was their "great importance to the public,,,157 an explanation which

food label make them inherently misleading"). The government initially had made a similar
argument in the Coors litigation-namely, that alcohol content disclosure was "inherently
misleading"-but failed to pursue this point on appeal. See Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady, 944
F.2d 1543, 1547 n.2 (10th Cir. 1991). Curiously, the FDA did not make this argument in
defending the constitutionality of its proposed restrictions on tobacco advertising. See 60 Fed.
Reg. at 41,354 (,The Central Hudson analysis begins with the second prong.").
155. See Kellogg Co. v. Mattox, 763 F. Supp. 1369, 1381 (N.D. Tex.) (holding, on request
for preliminary injunction, that food manufacturer was not likely to prevail on its First
Amendment claim because the State's detentions of a product on adulteration and misbranding
grounds "only restrain the ability of the distributors who received the detention order to sell the
product"), affd mem., 940 F.2d 1530 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. General Nutrition, Inc.;
638 F. Supp. 556, 562 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that the substantial government interest in
prohibiting deceptive labeling justified the "extremely narrow encroachment" on commercial
speech caused by FDA sanctions against the distributor of a dietary supplement); United States
v. Articlej; of Food ... Clover Club Potato Chips, 67 F.R.D. 419, 424 (D. Idaho 1975)
(summarily rejecting manufacturer's proposed First Amendment defense to seizure of its food
products for false and misleading statements in its labeling); United States v. Articles of Drug,
32 F.R.D. 32, 34-35 (S.D. Ill. 1963) (sustaining the FDA's statutory authority to seize copies
of a book used as false and misleading labeling for vitamin and mineral products, and rejecting
First Amendment objection because the seizure did not affect the book's availability to interested
readers); United States v. 8 Cartons, Containing ... Molasses, 103 F. Supp. 626, 628 (W.D.N.Y.
1951) (same); see also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 495-96 (1982) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to ordinance regulating the sale of
drug-paraphernalia within a certain proximity of any literature encouraging illegal drug use).
156. 58 Fed. Reg. at 2525. Previously, the FDA prohibited all health claims on food
products, see supra note 19, but not necessarily on the theory that such claims would misbrand
the food. Instead, the Agency took the position that therapeutic claims would affect the product's
regulatory classification, converting an erstwhile food into a drug. See, e.g., Nutrilab, Inc. v.
Schweiker, 713 F.2d 335, 337-38 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. An Article of Drug ...
Honey, 218 F. Supp. 208, 211 (B.D. Mich. 1963), affd, 344 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1965). Health
claims could still have been made for such a "drug" product, but only if the manufacturer
satisfied the FDA's strict new drug approval requirements. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994); 21
C.F.R. pt. 314 (1994); see also Lars Noah, Sham Petitioning as a Threat to tlW Integrity o/the
Regulatory Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. I, 6-10 (1995) (summarizing the new drug approval
requirements).
157. 58 Fed. Reg. at 2526 ("Because health claims are of great importance to the public,
they have a great potential to be deceptive: Representations relating a product to an issue of
public concern as a means to induce consumer purchases may take on increased importance in
the mind of the public and thus be more likely to mislead."). Another reason includes
consumers' assumptions that the Agency has verified all information in the label. Id.; see also
American Home Ptods. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 698 (3d Cir. 1982). If this sufficed to
eliminate First Amendment protections, however, then any information disclosures in highly
regulated industries might be vulnerable to government prohibitions.
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seems to reinforce rather than weaken the underlying claim for First
Amendment protection. ISS At its base, the FDA's position that unap
proved health claims are "inherently misleading" appears to represent a
simple policy judgment rather than an empirically-based conclusion. 159
Individual enforcement actions against products whose labeling
includes misleading claims undoubtedly are permissible, in part because
the government shoulders the burden of proof in these proceedings. l60
But the First Amendment does not authorize broad prophylactic rules
against truthful claims merely because they may have some undefined
potential to mislead consumers.161 For instance, one lower court held
unconstitutional a state restriction on the use of the term "butter" in
advertising for butter substitutes because the limitation applied without
regard to whether the use of that term was misleading in the particular
case. 162 In response to industry comments citing this decision, the FDA
relied on congressional concerns over the use by some manufacturers of
inaccurate or ambiguous nutrient content claims or scientifically
unfounded health messages. 163
In spite of the Agency's arguments to the contrary, health claims on
foods are not "inherently" misleading. In the wake of Coors, if a
manufacturer wishes to make a truthful and carefully qualified claim, the
FDA should not be able to prohibit that claim unless it can demonstrate
some reasonable likelihood that consumers might be misled. Instead, the
Agency offered the tautological argument that a claim is intrinsically

158. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983).
159. Cf Richard Craswell,lnterpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657, 659-60
(1985).
160. See, e.g., United States v. An Article of Food ... "Diet Thins," 377 F. Supp. 746,
748-49 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (noting that the government must prove that label representation is
either false or misleading); see also United States v. 60 28-Capsule Bottles ... "Unitrol," 325
F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1963). Of course, the courts often defer to an agency's expert judgment that
a claim is likely to mislead consumers. See, e.g., Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 318-20 (7th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254 (1993).
161. See 58 Fed. Reg. 2302, 2395 (1993) ("Some comments argued that the requirement
that the proponent of an undefined claim submit a petition for its approval unconstitutionally
shifts the burden of distinguishing misleading and nonmisleading speech from the Government
to the speaker."); see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,646 (1985)
("Were we to accept the State's argument in this case, we would have little basis for preventing
the government from suppressing other forms of truthful and nondeceptive advertising simply
to spare itself the trouble of distinguishing such advertising from false or deceptive advertis
ing."); Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. 747, 756 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(explaining that "a legislative body cannot justify its restrictions on commercial speech simply
by declaring that marketing claims are misleading"), ajJ'd, 44 F.3d 726, 731-32 (9th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 62 (1995).
162. See Lever Bros. Co. v. Maurer, 712 F. Supp. 645, 652-53 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
163. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 2395-96.
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misleading if not pre-approved by the FDA because the use of such an
unapproved claim would constitute a misbranding violation under the
statute. l64 The Agency simply noted that "Congress chose to permit
only those health claims on food that FDA determines to be scientifical
ly valid, effectively recognizing that health claims are so potentially
misleading as to be inherently misleading.,,16s Such a generalized and
impressionistic finding of past abuses cannot, however, suffice to allow
legislators or regulators to announce that any unapproved but truthful
claims are prohibited because of the risk that some other claims could
mislead some consumers.
Thus, although the government may have a substantial interest in
combatting potentially misleading claims, its remedial choice must be
evaluated under the nexus requirements of the Central Hudson test.
There is simply no merit to the FDA's effort to pretermit that analysis
by characterizing unapproved health claims as inherently misleading
under the first prong. While it is true that the commercial speech at
issue here has the potential to mislead some consumers and has been
abused in the past, it does not follow that health claims as a class of
speech are inherently misleading and, therefore, wholly unprotected by
the First Amendment.
3. Are the Government's Interests Substantial?
Applying Central Hudson's second prong, the government's interest
in regulating health claims to promote public health is undeniably
sqbstantial. l66 The Court also has recognized the government's interest
in "insuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as
well as freely.,,167 More precisely, the FDA argued that consumers
have a First Amendment interest in obtaining information on which to
base choices about product purchases and that this interest is " 'served

164. See id. at 2525 ("Because FDA case law makes clear that a label statement that
misbrands a food product is not subject to First Amendment protection, an unapproved health
claim on a food label would not be protected speech.").
165. Id. at 2526 ("Experience had shown that many 'unfounded' health claims were being
used on foods."). In attempting to argue that health claims are inherently misleading, the FDA
also relied on In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982), claiming that speech which "experience
has proved ... is subject to abuse" is unprotected under the First Amendment. 58 Fed. Reg. at
2526. But the Court struck down the attorney advertising restrictions which were at issue in
R.M.J., finding no nexus between the restriction and a substantial state interest. See 455 U.S. at
206-07.
166. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986).
167. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
772 (1976).
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by insuring that the information is not false or deceptive.' ,,168 At one
point in the preamble, the Agency referred to "the Government's interc"l
in ensuring the scientific validity of health claims on the food la
beL"169 But surely this is a substantial interest only insofar as it
furthers the interest in protecting consumers from false and misleading
claims; the FDA is not a peer review mechanism for the scientific
community.
Evidently, Congress was concerned that consumers might be misled
by unregulated health claims and the consequent impact these claims
might have on public health and safety.170 Its concern was tempered,
however, by a countervailing interest in maximizing the disclosure of
information about nutrition and health. 171 Indeed, as the Court noted
in Coors, the NLEA reflects a preference for informing consumers about
the relationship between diet and health.172 The Agency itself has
acknowledged that "consumers will lose valuable information" if truthful
health claims are withheld from the public.!73

168. 58 Fed. Reg. at 2526 (citing National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d
157, 162 (7th Cir. 1977), in support of this proposition, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978».
Although the court in Egg Nutrition recognized the government's interest in protecting
consumers, it also required that the FTC order, which mandated that the industry include
opposing scientific studies in its advertisements whenever making positive health claims about
eggs, be modified to conform with First Amendment requirements. See Egg Nutrition, 570 F.2d
at 164 (noting that the First Amendment prevents the FTC from imposing a remedy against fa[se
or misleading speech which was broader than necessary to accomplish its goal of preventing
consumer deception).
169. 58 Fed. Reg. at 2525; see also 59 Fed. Reg. 395, 422 (1994) (asserting that the
"FDA's regulation of health claims in labeling bears a specific relationship to the interests the
agency has asserted because it is directed specifically at ensuring the reliability and validity of
these claims").
.
170. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 2526.
171. See supra note 18; see also Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-417, § 2(13), 108 Stat. 4326 (finding that, "although the Federal Government
should take swift action against products that are unsafe or adulterated, the Federal Government
should not take any actions to impose unreasonable regulatory barriers limiting or slowing the
flow of safe products and accurate information to consumers").
172. See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1590-91. The Coors Court did, however, apparently concede
that the government could have a substantial interest in altering consumers' behavior by denying
them access to information which itself was neither false nor misleading. See id. at 1591 ("[l1he
Government here has a significant interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its
citizens by preventing brewers from competing on the basis of alcohol strength, which could
lead to greater alcoholism and its attendant social costs."). The Court explained that previously,
in Posadas, "we found that the Puerto Rico Legislature's interest in promoting the health, safety,
and welfare of its citizens by reducing their demand for gambling provided a sufficiently
'substantial' governmental interest to justify the regulation of gambling advertising." Jd.
173. 56 Fed. Reg. 60,856, 60,869 (1991) (In its initial Regulatory Impact Analysis, the FDA
recognized that, "if [health] claims that are likely to be true are removed, this will decrease the
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It is simply inaccurate, therefore, to focus exclusively on the
undoubted legislative concern that consumers not be duped by false or
misleading labeling claims. The fundamental question remains whether
the restriction is tailored to accomplish the government's stated ends
without taking anyone of those goals out of context and assigning it
exaggerated weight in the calculus. Mter its lengthy attempt to avoid
having to undertake the Central Hudson test, however, the Agency's
preamble gives scant attention to explaining how its regulations satisfy
the nexus requirements, dismissing this task with a few conclusory
sentences.174
4. Do the Restrictions Advance Those Interests?
Under Central Hudson's third prong, the health claims restrictions
must directly advance the government's substantial interests. 175 In
Coors, which struck down the prohibition against alcohol content
disclosure under prong three, the Court emphasized that the government
has the burden of showing that the regulation at issue advances its
asserted interests "in a direct and material way.,,176 Most importantly,
Coors demanded evidence to support the judgment that a particular
restriction will achieve the government's purposes. Apart from citing the
floor statements of a few members of Congress,177 which are surely
nothing more than the "anecdotal evidence and educated guesses"
rejected as inadequate in Coors,178 the FDA failed to identify anywhere

total benefits of the 1990 amendments as consumers will lose valuable information."); see also
60 Fed. Reg. 66,206, 66,214 (1995) ("The agency has no desire for its regulations to
unnecessarily stand in the way of the use of health claims and the presentation of the important
information contained therein."). Indeed, for several decades, notwithstanding growing evidence
of an association with coronary heart disease, the Agency had prohibited any reference to
cholesterol in food labeling. See 24 Fed. Reg. 9990 (1959).
174. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 2526-27.
175. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980) (requiring that "the regulatory technique must be in proportion to that interest" and must
"be designed carefully to achieve the State's goal").
176. Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1592 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ibanez V.
Florida Dep't of Business & Professional Regulation, 114 S. Ct. 2084, 2090 (1994) (refusing to
"allow rote invocation of the words 'potentially misleading' to supplant the [government's]
burden").
177. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 2526; 58 Fed. Reg. 2302, 2393-94 (1993).
178. See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1593; see also Turner Broadcasting Sys. V. FCC, 114 S. Ct.
2445, 2470-72 (1994) (plurality) (remanding First Amendment challenge to 1992 cable statute
notwithstanding lengthy congressional hearings and detailed findings, including reliance on a
study conducted by the FCC); Edenfield V. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1800 (1993) (explaining that
the government's "burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture"). The FDA already
has taken some comfort, however, in the Went For It majority's willingness to accept anecdotal
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in its otherwise thorough preambles any evidence to suggest that its
demanding requirements are likely to reduce a risk of consumer
deception.
One must also assess the purported linkage between the health claims
restrictions and the government's broader public health purpose
associated with providing consumers new information about the
relationship between diet and health. The effect of the regulations is to
deprive consumers of this very information, except in extremely limited
circumstances in which the FDA has approved a health claim. There
appears to be no direct connection between the suppression of unap
proved but truthful health claims, and the protection of public health.
Moreover, prohibiting the use of an approved claim on a product simply
because it contains a disqualifying level of some other nutrient that the
FDA regards as unhealthy (e.g., sodium) has absolutely nothing to do
with the potential for the health claim to mislead consumers, though the
Agency expressed concerns that a truthful health claim may lead
consumers to believe that the product is healthy in all respects. 179 This
expansive notion seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court's repeated
admonition that the First Amendment protects even incomplete
information, trusting consumers to make intelligent choices. 180
Instead, the FDA hopes to influence consumers' choices by
selectively limiting their access to product information. The Agency also
speculated that, even if consumers are oblivious to the information
appearing on food labels, manufacturers will have an incentive to
formulate nutritionally-improved products so as to be able to make the

evidence to support a restriction on commercial speech. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,354 (1995)
(defending proposed restrictions on tobacco advertising); see The Florida Bar v. Went For It,
Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2377-78 (1995) ("The anecdotal record mustered by the Bar is noteworthy
for its breadth and detail. ... In any event, we do not read our case law to require that empirical
data come to us accompanied by a surfeit of background information."). The Court was,
however, sharply divided on this and other aspects of the case. See id. at 2384 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) ("Our cases require something more than a few pages of self-serving and unsupported
statements by the State to demonstrate that a regulation directly and materially advances the
elimination of a real harm when the State seeks to suppress truthful and nondeceptive speech.").
179. See 60 Fed. Reg. 66,206, 66,212 (1995) ("Such claims would be misleading because
consumers would be purchasing the food, in part, to achieve a more healthful diet, when, in fact,
such foods are inconsistent with dietary guidelines."); 53 Fed. Reg. at 2528 ("Including a health
claim on the label of a food that contains unhealthful levels of nutrients would be misleading

..

.. ").

180. See, e.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 ("Even when advertising communicates
only an incomplete version of the relevant facts, the First Amendment presumes that some
accurate information is better than no information at all.").
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approved claims. 181 It is doubtful whether such a paternalistic regulato
ry scheme would pass First Amendment muster. 182
5. Do Less Restrictive Alternatives Exist?
Finally, even if the health claims restrictions arguably survive the
third prong of the Central Hudson test, they should fail under the fourth
prong. A law regulating potentially misleading advertising, designed to
prevent consumer confusion, must be "no broader than reasonably
necessary to prevent the deception.,,183 The FDA argued that its
regulations directly advance the government's legitimate interest in
ensuring that consumers have access to information about food that is
"scientifically valid, truthful, reliable, understandable, and not mislead
ing."l84 Although the highly prescriptive requirements applicable to
nutrient content claims and health messages no doubt will prevent the
use of false or misleading labeling claims, it is simply wrong to assert
that the regulations are no more extensive than necessary to serve the
government's asserted interests.
The FDA explained that it had carefully considered alternative
approaches before concluding that its regulation would best advance the

181. See 58 Fed. Reg. 2927,2940 (1993). The FDA has done this before in mandating the
use of exaggerated warnings about the risks of products containing chlorofluorocarbon (CFC)
propellants, solely in the hope of influencing purchasing behavior-and, thereby, encouraging
reformulation-even though the products posed no direct risks to consumers. See Noah, supra
note 40, at 313-14.
182. See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1597 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) ("[T]he
Constitution is most skeptical of supposed state interests that seek to keep people in the dark for
what the government believes to be their own good."); Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 482
(1987) ("We wholly rejected these justifications [in Virginia State Boardj, finding that the bar}
was predicated upon assumptions about the reactions the public would have if they obtained the
'wrong' kind of information."); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 577 (Blackmun, J., concurring)
("The Court ... [has] resolved beyond all doubt that a strict standard of review applies to
suppression of commercial information, where the purpose of the restraint is to influence
behavior by depriving citizens of information."); see also John E. Calfee, FDA Underestimates
Food Shoppers, WALL ST. J., May 29, 1991, at AIO (criticizing paternalistic attitude underlying
the FDA's health claims restrictions).
183. In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
184. 58 Fed. Reg. at 2525-26. The Agency also cites a decision predating Virginia State
Board which summarily rejected a First Amendment challenge to an FDA food labeling
regulation defining certain claims as misleading. See American Frozen Food Inst. v. Mathews,
413 F. SUpp. 548, 555 (D. D.C. 1976) ("Plaintiffs First Amendment argument ... is premised
upon Plaintiffs misconception that the regulations challenged proscribe truthful nonmisleading
labeling and advertising. These regulations constitute the conclusion by the Commissioner that
labeling which fails to meet the requirements of the regulation is misleading or otherwise not
in compliance with the Act."), affd on other grounds, 555 F.2d 1059, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(per curiam).
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government's substantial interests. 18s This may satisfy the Agency's
duties under the Administrative Procedure Act,186 but a self-serving
statement that it has taken the required "hard look" at the rulemaking
record will not insulate the health claims regulation from First Amend
ment scrutiny.187 Although the Agency repeatedly emphasizes that its
regulations do not restrict the dissemination of information through
avenues other than product labeling,188 even such a restrained prohibi
tion on truthful promotional claims may be unconstitutional. 189
In only limited situations has the Court upheld blanket prohibitions
on commercial speech, for instance as an allowable prophylactic rule to
minimize the inherent risks of coercion associated with personal
solicitation of potential clients by attorneys. "Unlike a public advertise
ment, which simply provides information and leaves the recipient free
to act upon it or not, in-person solicitation may exert pressure and often
demands an immediate response, without providing an opportunity for
comparison or reflection."I90 But the labeling and advertising of
consumer products, as noted in the quoted passage, differ substantially
from the personal solicitation that is sometimes at issue in the lawyer
advertising cases. Consumers have the opportunity to compare the
185. 59 Fed. Reg. 395, 423 (1994).
186. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 706(2)(A) (1994); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
187. Cf Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 108 (1990)
(plurality) (refusing to defer to State's judgment so as to "insulate it from our review for
constitutional infirmity").
188. See 59 Fed. Reg. at 422 ("Adequate alternative channels remain for the dissemination
of scientific information. For example, regulation of the information that may appear on the food
label in no way affects the ability of a scientist to publish experimental results in a journal.");
see also The Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2381 (1995) ("Finding no basis
to question the commonsense conclusion that the many alternative channels for communicating
necessary information about attorneys are sufficient, we see no defect in Florida's regulation.").
But see id. at 2385 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The State's restriction deprives accident victims
of information which may be critical to their right to make a claim for compensation for injuries.
The telephone book and general advertisements may [only] serve this purpose in part ....").
I 89. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69-70 n. I 8 (1983) (,,[O]ne is
not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea
that it may be exercised in some other place." (internal quotation marks omitted». For example,
the Court in Coors invalidated the labeling prohibition even though any interested consumer
could have gotten alcohol content information directly from BATE See 63 U.S.L.W. 3485
(1995) (describing exchange during oral argument between Justice Ginsburg and counsel for the
government).
190. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978); see also Edenfield v.
Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1803 (1993) (''The ban on attorney solicitation in Ohralik was
prophylactic in the sense that it prohibited conduct conducive to fraud or overreaching at the
outset, rather than punishing the misconduct after it occurred."); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n,
486 U.S. 466, 475 (1988) (contrasting written and personal solicitation).
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relative qualities of different consumer, products, including foods.
Congress and the FDA designed the new format of the nutrition
information label to facilitate precisely this activity .191 The suppression
of information rarely if ever represents the most direct means for
achieving a regulatory purpose (such as dampening consumer demand)
which is not related to the prevention of false or misleading claims. l92
The prohibition on unapproved health claims is out of proportion to
the government's asserted interests. Although this restriction will prevent
consumer deception at the hands of unscrupulous commercial enterprises
making false health claims, the reach of the regulation is overly broad.
Congress and the FDA need not prohibit all unapproved claims in order
to protect consumers;' individual enforcement actions against companies
which make unsubstantiated claims, as traditiona~ly pursued by the FrC,
would achieve the same end without depriving consumers of valuable
information. 193 A similar point has been made in criticisms of recent
state initiatives to restrict the use of "recyclable" and other environmen

191. 58 Fed. Reg. 2302, 2396 (1993) ("Standardizing the nutrition infonnation that appears
in food labeling, including nutrient content claims, will make it easier for consumers to find,
understand, and compare the infonnation they need to make healthy eating choices.").
192. See Centml Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 569
(1980) ("Such conditional and remote eventualities simply cannot justify silencing appellant's
promotional advertising."). In Coors, Justice Stevens took the position that, where the asserted
government interest is not related to the prevention of false or misleading statements but instead
relates to some collateral goal, commercial speech should be entitled to the same protections as
are accorded political speech under the First Amendment. See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1594
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); see also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 574 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) ("I seriously doubt whether suppression of infonnation concerning the availability
and price of a legally offered product is ever a permissible way for the State to 'dampen'
demand for or use of the product."). But see Lowenstein, supra note 85, at 1237-47 (disputing
claim that Court has invalidated commercial speech restrictions as paternalistic).
193. See Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Conswner Protection and the Regulation of
Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661, 671 (1977) ("[P]rotection of consumers against advertising
fmud should not bl? a broad, theoretical effort to achieve Truth, but rather a pmctical enterprise
to ensure the existence of reliable data which in tum will facilitate an efficient and reliable
competitive market process."). But see Richard M. Schmidt, Jr. & Robert C. Bums, Proof or
Consequences: False Advertising and the Doctrine of Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN, L. REv.
1273, 1281-82, 1290-91 (1988) (arguing that uncertainty about enforcement action impermissibly
chills protected speech, and favoring the use of blanket rules or guidelines).
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tal marketing claims. 194 Blanket prohibitions are neither necessary nor
appropriate in such situations.
In Coors, the Court acknowledged several less restrictive regulatory
alternatives that would achieve the government's asserted interest in
preventing strength wars. 195 Similarly, there are a number of effective
regulatory alternatives available to Congress and the FDA which would
protect consumers from misleading or untruthful health claims on food
labels. Some industry comments suggested requiring appropriate
disclaimers to accompany truthful claims which might otherwise be
misleading or which pertain to foods containing unacceptable levels of
other nutrients. 196 This is precisely the type of alternative endorsed by
the Court in Zauderer. 197 Although recognizing that the Supreme Court

194. See David Hoch & Robert Franz, Eco-Pom Versus the Constitution: Commercial
Speech and the Regulation ofEnvironmental Advertising, 58 ALB. L. REV. 441, 443-47 (1994);
Peter J. Tarsney, Note, Regulation of Environmental Marketing: Reassessing the Supreme
Court's Protection of Commercial Speech, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 533, 562-73 (1994); cf
John M. Church, A Market Solution to Green Marketing: Some Lessons from the Economics of
Information, 79 MINN. L. REV. 245, 324 (1994) ("Deceiving consumers under the guise of
advertising policy is completely inconsistent with the underpinnings of consumer protection and
should be avoided."). But see Jamie A. Grodsky, Certified Green: The Law and Future of
Environmental Labeling, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 147,183-92 (1993) (doubting that such restrictions
are vulnerable to a First Amendment challenge, though preferring a federal approach).
195. See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1593 (noting that such alternatives include a prohibition on
any marketing efforts which emphasize high alcohol content, prohibiting alcohol content
disclosure only for malt liquors rather than all malt beverages, and limiting the alcohol content
of beer); see also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1510 n.13
(1993) ("[WJhile we have rejected the 'least-restrictive-means' test for judging restrictions on
commercial speech, so too have we rejected mere rational basis review .... [IJf there are
numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech, that
is certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the 'fit' between ends and means
is reasonable.").
196. See 58 Fed. Reg. 2478, 2527 (1993) ("A number of comments recommended that
foods exceeding a disqualifying nutrient level be allowed to bear an approved health claim if
they also bear a statement disclosing the level of the disqualifying nutrient."); see also John M.
Blim, Comment, Free Speech and Health Claims Under the Nutrition Labeling and Education
Act of 199(j: Applying a Rehabilitated Central Hudson Test for Commercial Speech, 88 Nw. U.
L. REV. 733, 766-67 (1994); Melinda L. Sidak, Dietary Supplements and Commercial Speech,
48 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 441, 457 (1993) (suggesting a similar disclaimer statement for
unapproved health claims made on the labels of dietary supplements). In a controversial
decision, Congress recently authorized an exemption from the NLEA for certain claims on
dietary supplements when accompanied by a prominent disclaimer that the FDA has not
ev~.luated the claim. See Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-417, § 6, 108 Stat. 4329 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6) (1994)); F-D-C REPORTS ("The
Tan Sheet"), Oct. 31, 1994, at 3.
197. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 652 n.14 (1985) ("[AJII our
discussions of restraints on commercial speech have recommended disclosure requirements as
one of the acceptable less restrictive alternatives to actual suppression of speech."); see also Peel
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has expressed a preference for disclaimers rather than prohibitions on
potentially misleading speech, the FDA responded that, under the
NLEA, it may allow disclaimers instead of disqualification only on a
case-by-case basis where the "claim would assist consumers in
maintaining healthy dietary practices.,,198
Others have suggested replacing the premarket approval scheme for
health claims with a system similar to the FTC's substantiation
policy,199 which requires a "reasonable basis" for product claims and
is policed on a case-by-case basis.2°O Again this was one of the
alternatives endorsed by the Supreme Court in Zauderer.2° 1 Such an
approach would be in keeping with lower court decisions rejecting free
speech challenges to individualized FDA determinations that a particular

v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 109 (1990) (plurality) (noting
the "presumption favoring disclosure over concealment"); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976) (suggesting that it may be
"appropriate to require that a commercial message . . . include such additional information,
warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent [commercial speech from] being
deceptive").
198. 58 Fed. Reg. at 2528 (internal quotation marks omitted) ("In situations where the
government's substantial interest in improving dietary practices would be promoted by
permitting disclosure rather than disqualification, and where disclosure would ensure that the
health claim was not misleading, FDA will permit disclosure instead of disqualification.").
Although it recently proposed significant modifications to make the health claims regulations
more flexible, the Agency once again refused to permit disclosure as a substitute for .
disqualification. See 60 Fed. Reg. 66,206, 66,224 (1995).
199. See, e.g., Edward Dunkelberger & Sarah E. Taylor, The NLEA, Health Claims, and
the First Amendment, 48 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 631, 656-57 (1993). "Because FiC policy imposes
no restriction on truthful nondeceptive claims that are properly substantiated, it imposes a far
lighter burden on truthful speech than does FDA policy." [d. at 656.
200. See 49 Fed. Reg. 30,999 (1984) (FTC's "Policy Statement Regarding Advertising
Substantiation Program"); see also 16 C.F.R. pt. 260 (1995) (non-binding FTC guidelines.
governing environmental marketing claims); 59 Fed. Reg. 6279, 6280 (1994) (non-binding FDA
guidelines governing claims that recombinant bovine growth hormone was not used in the
production of milk); F-D-C REPORTS ("The Tan Sheet"), May 16, 1994, at 27 (describing the
FTC's new "enforcement policy statement" which in certain limited instances allows properly
qualified health claims in advertising for food products even if these claims are not approved
by the FDA for use in labeling). In its preamble, the FDA specifically rejected suggestions that
it adhere to case law involving the FTC. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 2528 ("FDA does not agree that
it is bound to follow cases involving FTC's regulation of advertising and to permit labeling that
presents one side of a scientific controversy, so long as there is a statement that a controversy
exists."). The FDA pointed out that there are "fundamental differences" between the two
agencies, characterizing the FTC as an agency concerned with economic regulation while the
"FDA is a scientific agency" concerned with the public health. [d. Elsewhere in the preamble,
however, it cites approvingly to favorable FTC precedents. See, e.g., id. at 2526.
201. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 649 ("The experience of the FTC is, again, instructive....
Given the possibility of policing the use of illustrations in advertisements on a case-by-case
basis, the prophylactic approach taken by Ohio cannot stand ....").

104

FWRIDA V. W REVIEW

[Vol. 47

labeling claim was false or misleading. 202 Although broad-based
rulemaking surely is more efficient for the Agency /03 the First
Amendment may demand a more particularized regulatory approach.204
This is especially important because of the risk of regulatory obsoles
cence/os particularly in contexts where scientific knowledge is subject
to rapid and sometimes unpredictable shifts.206 In any event, all of
these alternatives would reduce the burden on commercial speech while
still achieving the government's primary goal of preventing consumer
deception.

202. See supra note 155; see also 21 U.S.c. § 343(r)(6) (1994) (imposing substantiation'
rather than preapproval requirement for certain nutrient claims on dietary supplements); Kraft,
Inc. v. FfC, 970 F.2d 311, 320-21 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to FfC
enforcement action), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254 (1993); FfC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 778 F.2d 35,43-45 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (same); Pitofsky, supra note 193, at 673 (predicting
that FfC enforcement activities would withstand First Amendment challenges); Tarsney, supra
note 194, at 535-36,568 (favoring case-by-case control over environmental marketing claims).
203. See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FfC, 482 F.2d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
("[T]here is little question that the availability of substantive rule-making gives any agency an
invaluable resource-saving flexibility in carrying out its task of regulating parties subject to its
statutory mandate."), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); Mark H. Grunewald, The NLRB's First
Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 DUKE LJ. 274, 282, 318-21 (1991); see also 58
Fed. Reg. 2302, 2396 (1993) (arguing that the NLEA forced the FDA to issue nutrient content
claim regulations rather than adjudicate individual cases under its existing misbranding
authority).
204. See Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988) ("If [case-by-case
enforcement] is not the most efficient means of preventing fraud, we reaffirm simply and
emphatically that the First Amendment does not permit the State to sacrifice speech for
efficiency."); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 571 n.13 (suggesting a screening procedure for
advertisements as less restrictive than a flat prohibition); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645,656 (1972) (,,[T]he Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.").
205. See Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group
Fonnation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 910-21 (1994); Teresa
M. Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products Liability Actions, 41 VAND.
L. REV. 1121, 1151-52 (1988); see also supra note 135 (canvassing the Supreme Court's
treatment of the passage of time when resolving constitutional challenges to government
restrictions on speech); Richard Neely, Obsolete Statutes, Structural Due Process, and the Power
of Courts to Demand a Second Legislative Look, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 271 (1982) (reviewing
GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982)).
206. See supra note 139; see also Redish, supra note 145, at 1443 (emphasizing the
"principle of epistemological humility" and concluding that, "viewed from the broad perspective
of history, any attempt by the government to lock in a prevailing scientific consensus is likely
to be either futile or dangerous"); Tarsney, supra note 194, at 564-68 (explaining that constant
technological and scientific advances make prophylactic restrictions on environmental marketing
claims inappropriate).
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B. Product Warning Statements

Although one might object to government-mandated warning
statements as an example of coerced speech,207 the Supreme Court has
endorsed risk labeling as one type of disclosure that may be required to
combat otherwise misleading claims of product safety or effective
ness.20g The government still would have to demonstrate that a
particular warning requirement is reasonably necessary to accomplish
such a purpose. Warnings often are justified as necessary to provide
complete information about a product, without which the labeling might
be misleading for failing to include material information. Mandatory risk
labeling which itself provides misleading or exaggerated information in
pursuit of some other purpose, such as encouraging manufacturers to
reformulate their products,209 seems constitutionally problematic.
Nonetheless, because mandatory warnings are limited disclosure
requirements rather than prophylactic prohibitions on truthful labeling,
the government's power to demand warnings generally is accepted as
legitimate. In fact, such labeling frequently is regarded as a favorable
compromise for manufacturers in situations where the product itself
otherwise might have been banned.
As explained previously, however, government risk labeling
requirements often are accompanied by strict prohibitions on the
voluntary provision of additional or clarifying information,zlo These
restrictions are justified as necessary to protect the integrity of the risk
information designed by lawmakers, so that manufacturers will not

207. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1519-22 (1995); Riley, 487
U.S. at 795-98; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 11-21 (1986)
(plurality); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1977); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974). In defending its proposed requirement that the tobacco
industry underwrite a $150 million annual public education campaign to discourage smoking by
youngsters, the FDA cited decisions upholding "corrective" advertising orders imposed by other
agencies. See 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,356 (1995). It should be noted, however, that the courts
have sometimes modified such orders when they seemed overly broad. See, e.g., National
Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157, 164 Fth Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821
(1978).
208. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy V. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 772 n.24 (1976) (explaining that it may be appropriate to require that a commercial
message "include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to
prevent its being deceptive"); cf. Dole V. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 34 (1990)
(rejecting claim that risk disclosure regulation was subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act,
noting that an "agency chooses to impose a warning requirement because it believes that such
a requirement is the least intrusive measure that will sufficiently protect the public").
209. See Noah, supra note 40, at 313-14 (describing CPSC and FDA warning requirements
for CFCs), 342-43 (describing California's carcinogen warning requirement).
210. See supra Part I.C.

106

FLORIDA LA W REVIEW

(Vol. 47

dilute the impact of mandatory warning statements by including
disclaimers?1I In some instances, such limitations have generated
significant controversy. The FDA's formal prohibition on disclaimers to
product warnings emerged during a long-running battle with a group of
physicians who treated diabetic patients. 212 On the basis of a govern
ment study which had been criticized for a variety of methodological
flaws, the Agency decided to require a warning in the labeling of oral
hypoglycemic agents,213 and it successfully rejected the physicians'
request that their disputes with the study's design be included anywhere
in the warning. 214 But even if the Agency is confident that it has struck
the appropriate balance at the time it first issues such a warning
requirement, new information frequently comes to light justifying a
revision in labeling that the FDA cannot respond to promptly because
it must first initiate the frequently slow process of revising the regula
tion.
Even with products directed to lay consumers, some restrictions on
the permissible content of warning labels make little sense. For instance,
the so-called exclusivity rule for OTe drug products, which prohibits
even the slightest deviation from the FDA's prescribed warning
statements, does not seem to be justifiable as necessary to reduce
potentially misleading claims in labeling. Strict warning requirements of
this sort promote uniformity, but it remains unclear whether such
uniformity actually advances any substantial public health interest or,
instead, just simplifies the FDA's compliance monitoring activities. Only
recently did the Agency permit companies to substitute certain syn
onyms within the mandatory warning statements. 215

211. See 40 Fed. Reg. 28,582, 28,583 (1975) ("[W]arnings about possible hazards
associated with the use of a drug must, to be effective, remain undiluted by expressions of
opinion discounting the risk."); 39 Fed. Reg. 33,229, 33,232 (1974) ("[W]here warnings are
required, disclamatory opinions necessarily detract from the warning in such a manner as to be
confusing and misleading."). Ironically, the FDA recently encouraged manufacturers of certain
therapeutic products to include disclaimers with the EPA's mandatory warning for ozone
depleting substances so as not to discourage medically necessary uses. See 58 Fed. Reg. 34,812,
34,813 (1993).
212. See Gina B. Kolata, Controversy over Study of Diabetes Drug Continues for Nearly
a Decade, 203 SCIENCE 986 (1979). One of the skirmishes in this battle concerned the
physicians' request under the Freedom of Information Act for access to the study'~ records, a
request that the FDA successfully denied. See Forsham v. Califano, 587 F.2d 1128, 1133-34
(D.C. Cir. 1978), afJ'd, 445 U.S. 169 (1980).
213. See 21 C.F.R. § 310.517 (1994).
214. See Bradley v. Weinberger, 483 F.2d 410 (1st Cir. 1973).
215. See 59 Fed. Reg. 3998, 4000 (1994) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 330.I(i) (1994»
(allowing OTC drug product manufacturers to interchange words such as "consult" and "ask,"
and "physician" and "doctor"). In other cases, the FDA has only provided detailed guidelines
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Finally, limitations on the inclusion of additional risk information in
labeling seem especially dubious. Like the rules against disclaimers, the
FDA regards such a prohibition as necessary to preserve the integrity of
the warning labels that it has so carefully designed. Nonetheless, unlike
disclaimers which might be use'd in an effort to circumvent an agency's
judgment that a product poses a significant risk, manufacturers may
wish to provide additional warnings even though they may lose sales as
a result. 216 To be sure, the government has an interest in preventing
both the dilution of existing warnings by unnecessary label clutter and
the possibility of overreaction to additional warnings of less serious or
unsubstantiated risks.217 A blanket prohibition on the inclusion of
additional risk information does not, however, seem narrowly tailored
to advance these goals.
C. Continuing Medical Education Programs
The FDA frequently defends strict labeling restrictions by noting that
it does not limit the discussion of scientific information through other
channels.2ls Althpugh not a direct labeling restriction, the Agency's
proposed limitations on CME programs represent yet another effort to
restrict the transmittal of truthful, nonmisleading information in the
pursuit of a secondary governmental goal. Whereas the FDA has enacted
a blanket prohibition on all unapproved health claims in food labeling,
the proposed regulation of industry-supported educational activities is
somewhat more subtle, an~ potentially more pernicious.219 The Agency

for the types of risk information that must appear in labeling. See 21 C.F.R. § 801.430(d) (1994)
(requiring toxic shock syndrome waming for tampons).
216. The additional warnings nonetheless may be motivated by self-interest, as companies
attempt to minimize their tort liability. The FDA sometimes ·objects to what it regards as
"defensive" labeling that lacks any basis in experience with a product. See Noah, supra note 50,
at 148-50 & n.52.
217. See Noah, supra note 40, at 381-90. A similar argument might be made in defense of
strict food labeling controls. See 58 Fed. Reg. 2079, 2107 (1993) (noting that the inclusion of
excessive information "would interfere with consumers' abilities to use the information of the
greatest public health significance").
218. See, e.g., 59 Fed. Reg. 39?, 422 (1994) ("Adequate alternative channels remain for the
dissemination of scientific information. For example, regulation of the information that may
appear on the food label in no way affects the ability of a scientist to publish experimental
results in a journal."); 40 Fed. Reg. 28,582, 28,583 (1975); 39 Fed. Reg. 33,229,33,231 (1974)
("[D]ebate and disagreement is properly the subject of scientific discussions in professional
journals and symposia, but not in drug labeling.").
219. See Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, FDA Efforts to Control the Flow ofInfonnation
at Phannaceutical Industry-Sponsored Medical Education Programs: A Regulatory Overdose,
24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1325,1363-69 (1994). While no final regulations have been issued to
implement the provisions of the Draft Policy Statement, the very existence of the published
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already prohibits any labeling references to unapproved therapeutic uses
of approved drugs or medical devices. 22o The CME policy attempts to
prevent any direct or indirect manufacturer involvement in discussions
of such off-label uses even when they occur in scientific rather than
commercial settings, and even though the Agency repeatedly has
recognized the lawfulness and even value of off-label prescribing by
physicians?2J With regard to CME activities, it is even more difficult
to understand how a prohibition on company-supported educational
activities relating to that company's own products can be justified in
light of the First Amendment concerns discussed above.
As previously explained, the policy would regulate as promotional
labeling or advertising all company-supported educational activities
which relate to a company's product.222 The proposal does not entirely
prohibit industry financial support of continuing medical education;
rather, it threatens supporting companies with enforcement action against
their products if their support is perceived as tainting the information
presented. Nonetheless, as the FDA candidly admits, "the constraints on
advertising and labeling, when applied to scientific and educational
activities, can restrict the freedom of participants to discuss their data
or express their views.,,223 Thus, the Draft Policy Statement might
impermissibly chill the socially valuable exchange of scientific ideas.
The asserted governmental goal is to ensure that companies within the
industry do not use their support of CME programs as a guise for
promoting their products, especially off-label uses of their products.224
The Draft Policy Statement draws a line between activities performed
by, or on behalf of, a company and those which are essentially
independent of company influence.225

"draft" is sufficient to curb industry-sponsored educational and scientific activities dramatically.
See Arthur N. Levine, FDA's Expanding Control Over Drug Promotion, in BAD PRESCRIPTION
FOR THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FDA CENSORSHIP OF DRUG ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION 23,
37-38 (Richard T. Kaplar ed., 1993). Despite the absence of final regulations, the matter has
been deemed ripe for judicial review. See Washington Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp.
26,33-36 (D. D.C. 1995).
220. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(d)(1), 360e(d)(2)(A) (1994); 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.56(c), 801.5(a)
(1994); 40 Fed. Reg. 15,392, 15,394 (1975).
221. See Noah, supra note 50, at 142-44.
222. See supra Part I.D.
223. 57 Fed. Reg. at 56,412 (footnote omitted).
224. See id.
225. See id.
In determining whether an activity is independent of the substantive influence of
a company, the agency examines whether and to what extent the company is in a
position to influence the presentation of information related to its products or
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The FDA's attempt to regulate industry-sponsored scientific and
educational activities raises a number of questions concerning the First
Amendment rights of companies to speak about their products as well
. as the rights of professionals to receive accurate scientific information.
At the very least, the content of scientific and educational programs is
entitled to commercial speech protection, and some commentators have
argued that this type of information qualifies as "mixed" or even "pure"
speech deserving full First Amendment protection.226 In order to justify
its proposed CME restrictions, therefore, the government must at least
demonstrate that it has a substantial interest in regulating the speech in
question, that its restriction directly advances this interest, and that the
. restriction is narrowly tailored to accomplish its goal.227 Unlike its
food labeling preambles, the Agency has offered no real constitutional
defense of its CME policy.228

otherwise use the presentation as an advertising vehicle. FDA is concerned that
companies may influence content of educational programs not only directly, by
being involved in the selection of speakers or in the treatment of topics, but also
indirectly through the nature of the relationship between the company and the
provider (e.g., if the provider believes that future financial support from the
company depends upon producing programs that promote the company's products).

Id. at 56,412-13.
226. See Redish, supra note 145, at 1443-44 (''Few free speech observers would find
constitutionally tolerable a widespread system of governmental suppression of scientific opinion,
even when that opinion differed dramatically from the prevailing scientific consensus .... The
belief that the very same scientific claims automatically lose their full level of constitutional
protection when made by a product manufacturer in a commercial advertisement needs some
logical basis, in terms of free speech theory, for the drawing of such a strict dichotomy. It is
doubtful, however, that such a basis may be found." (footnote omitted)); cf. Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1594-95 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (suggesting
that the distinction between commercial speech and full First Amendment protection is
inappropriate where the restriction in question "neither prevents misleading speech nor protects
consumers from the dangers of incomplete information").
227. See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1590-93; Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Servo
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564-66 (1980).
228. In response to First Amendment criticisms leveled against the Agency for its broad
regulation of communications concerning therapeutic products, one high-ranking FDA official
merely offered a reiteration of the defenses presented in the preambles to the NLEA
implementing regulations. See David G. Adams, FDA Regulation of Communications on
Phannaceutical Products, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1399, 1414-15 (1994) ("Although the agency
has yet to address these questions in any formal manner with regard to pharmaceutical products,
the agency has addressed similar issues in the context of food labeling.... [T]he agency stated
that the restrictions on speech inherent in regulation of labeling claims are incidental and related
to regulation of the products themselves and that, in any event, the constitutional protections for
commercial speech are not abridged by the proposed regulation." (footnote omitted)).
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The proposed restrictions have no direct, immediate connection to the
FDA's asserted purpose of preventing the dissemination of false or
misleading statements about drug products and medical devices. The
proposal does not seek to regulate statements which are actually false
or misleading, but rather statements which the Agency presumes may
tend to be false or misleading. There is little basis to support the FDA's
intuitive, ex ante judgment that the close involvement of a pharmaceuti
cal or medical device company in a CME program necessarily taints the
information presented. The fact that a speaker may be motivated by self
interest has long been deemed an insufficient basis for stripping speech
of constitutional protection?29
Moreover, while the food labeling regulations were enacted under a
mandate from Congress, and are supported by something of a legislative
record, the proposed restrictions on scientific and educational activities
do not rest on nearly so solid a foundation. The Draft Policy Statement
contains little justification for the proposed restrictions beyond the
assertion that company-sponsored events pertaining to company products
are promotional and, therefore, are subject to Agency constraints on
advertising and labeling.230 Concerns about the potential to mislead,
which may be valid in the context of consumer product labeling, seem
much less reasonable where the intended audience is a group of highly
educated and sophisticated professionals with specialized knowledge in
the fields being discussed. 231 The proposed guidelines do not directly

229. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the State Univ. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989)
("Some of our most valued forms of fully protected speech are uttered for a profit.").
230. In its most recent discussion of the matter, the FDA takes the following position:

Because drugs and devices are regulated based on their "intended use" ... , the
agency's policies may have an unavoidable effect on the dissemination of
information regarding unapproved uses for approved products. However, FDA
emphasizes that these policies are narrowly drawn and are intended to further
describe FDA's regulation of drugs and devices (not speech), to ensure that
sponsors demonstrate that their drugs or devices are safe and effective for their
intended uses, and to protect consumers from the risks associated with the
unapproved use of drugs and devices whose safety and efficacy for the unapproved
use have not been established.
59 Fed. Reg. 59,820, 59,825 (1994). The Agency also noted that its "broad experience reviewing
promotional materials and scientific data suggests that determining whether information is
'truthful' may depend on a variety of factors, including time, context, publication bias, [and]
lack of stringent [peer] review." /d. at 59,826; see also 60 Fed. Reg. 62,471, 62,472 (1995)
(inviting comments on draft FDA guidance which would allow companies to disseminate reprints
of peer-reviewed scientific articles).
231. See Noah, supra note 40, at 326-27,346 (describing the FDA's and courts' recognition
of the special status of physicians); Paul H. Rubin, Are Pharmaceutical Ads Deceptive?, 49
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advance the Agency's asserted interest in preventing false or misleading
speech about the therapeutic products which it regulates.
Furthermore, the possibility that biased information might be
presented at a company-sponsored educational event does not justify the
wholesale burdening of this category of speech. On the contrary, the
policing of industry-sponsored educational and scientific events seems
ideally suited for case-by-case adjudication. It is generally inappropriate
to restrict an entire category of speech in order to guard against a
possible subset of false or misleading speech. The CME guidelines are
not narrowly tailored to accomplish the government's objective. Because
it would regulate as advertising all product-related speech funded or
otherwise supported by a company, the policy clearly is more "expan
sive than necessary.,,232
IV.

CONCLUSION

It remains unclear, in light of recent developments in commercial
speech case law, how the courts will react to government initiatives such
as the FDA's food labeling regulations and CME policy. It is very
likely, however, that these broad regulatory schemes will be challenged
by affected parties. Recent decisions suggest that commercial speech, so
long as it is truthful and nonmisleading, will continue to receive
heightened protection.233

FOOD & DRUG LJ. 7, 18-19 (1994); see also The Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct.
2371, 2382 (1995) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Speech has the capacity to convey complex
substance, yielding various insights and interpretations depending upon the identity of the
listener or the reader and the context of its transmission.").
232. Board of Trustees, 492 U.S. at 476-77; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565 (''The
regulatory technique may extend only as far as the interest it serves.").
233. As this Article went to publication, the Supreme Court decided 44 Liquonnart, Inc.
v. Rhode Island, striking down the State's prohibition against alcohol price advertising. See 64
U.S.L.W. 4313, 4322 (May 13, 1996); see also supra note 129 (discussing the lower court
decisions in the case). The Court held unanimously that the Twenty-First Amendment provided
the State with no presumption of constitutional validity, but the Justices disagreed substantially
over the proper First Amendment rationale for the Court's decision. In his plurality opinion,
Justice Stevens argued that the advertising prohibition failed Central Hudson's nexus prongs,
dismissing the holding in Posadas as an aberration and suggesting that outright bans on
commercial speech should be subject to closer constitutional scrutiny. See 64 U.S.L.W. at 4319
22. Justice O'Connor, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Souter and
Breyer, concurred in the judgment on the narrower ground that the challenged restriction failed
Central Hudson's fourth prong. See id. at 4326-27 (refusing to adopt a new analysis for
evaluating commercial speech). In his separate concurrence, Justice Thomas concluded that the
government's asserted interest (i.e., keeping consumers of lawful products ignorant of truthful
information to manipulate their marketplace choices) was illegitimate per se. See id. at 4323.
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The shift to rulemaking and away from the classic adjudicatory
model of enforcement actions against false or misleading claims poses
important constitutional questions. As recently elaborated in Rubin v.
Coors, commercial free speech doctrine may disempower agencies from
engaging in otherwise authorized rulemaking, such as the regulation of
labeling and advertising, where the effect of such regulation is over- or
underinclusive. Rulemaking to limit truthful statements merely on the
basis that they may have some potential to mislead is sloppy lawmaking,
paternalistic, and constitutionally unsound.

